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We present the results of the first empirical study of the extent to which 
businesses have switched to arbitration after AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion. T???????????????????????????????Concepcion led commentators to 
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predict that every business soon would use an arbitration clause, coupled with 
a class arbitration waiver, in their standard form contracts to avoid the risk of 
class actions. We examine two samples of franchise agreements: one sample in 
which we track changes in arbitration clauses since 1999, and a broader 
sample focusing on changes since 2011, immediately before Concepcion was 
decided. Our central finding is consistent across both samples of franchise 
agreements: the use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements has 
increased since Concepcion, but not dramatically. Most franchisors have not 
switched to arbitration. Our results necessarily are limited to franchise 
agreements and may not be generalizable to consumer and employment 
contracts. But they are consistent with the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau??? ???????????? ??????? on changes in arbitration clause use in credit 
card and checking account agreements since Concepcion. 
We then consider why only a handful of franchisors have switched to 
arbitration clauses since Concepcion. Those predicting a switch to arbitration 
assume both that there is no reason for a business not to use an arbitral class 
waiver and that businesses readily and costlessly can and will modify their 
form contracts. In our view, both assumptions are subject to question. First, 
some businesses have good reasons not to use an arbitration clause. By using 
an arbitration clause, businesses contract for a bundle of dispute resolution 
services, including, for example, a very limited right to appeal. If a business 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
may discourage the business from using an arbitration clause. Second, 
standard form contracts, like negotiated contracts, might be resistant to 
change ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????in other words, 
????????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????????? We find empirical evidence to 
support both possible explanations. The Article concludes by considering how 
???? ???????? ?????????? decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant might affect the future use of arbitration clauses, as well as the 
use of class action waivers that are not part of an arbitration clause. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
???? ???????? ???????? ????????? ??? AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion1 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 a 
?????????? ???? ????????? ????????????3 ???? ?one of the most important 
???? ?????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??? ?? ????? ????? ??????4 In 
 
 1.  131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 2.  Bob Sullivan, After High Court Ruling, Firms Divide and Conquer in Consumer Cases, 
http://perma.cc/6MCH-­HCJY (nbcnews.com, archived Mar. 9, 2014) (quoting Ed Mierzwinski, 
U.S. Public Interest Research Group). 
 3.  Bruce D. Greenberg, A Poor Judicial Product and a Disaster for Consumer Protection: A 
Lengthy Analysis of AT&T v. Concepcion, http://perma.cc/WXP-­864B (appellatelaw-­nj.com, 
archived Mar. 9, 2014);; see also Ian Millhiser, ???????????????????????????????????????????????
Consumers, http://perma.cc/6W68-­WD4Z (thinkprogress.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014) 
?????? Concepcion turns out badly it will be a disaster for millions of American consumers and a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 4.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-­Action Arbitration, 
http://perma.cc/6N5W-­??????????????????????????????????????????????he decision basically lets 
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Concepcion, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act ??????? 
preempts state court decisions invalidating class arbitration waivers 
as unconscionable.5 After Concepcion, commentators predicted that 
every business soon would use an arbitration clause, coupled with a 
class arbitration waiver, in their standard form contracts to avoid the 
risk of class actions.6 ???????????7 of these arbitral class waivers was 
coming such that, ?[a]fter Concepcion, it is only a matter of time before 
nearly every credit card provider, cell phone company, mail-­order 
business or even every potential employer requires anyone who wants 
to do business with them to first give up their right to file a class 
????????8 
More recently, a similar chorus of criticisms followed the 
???????? ???????? ????????? ???American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant (?Amex?).9 In Amex, the Court rejected the argument that 
an arbitral class waiver was unenforceable because it precluded the 
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights, even though 
the lack of class relief arguably made proving the federal antitrust 
claim not economically feasible.10 This decision ended most if not all 
remaining uncertainty over the enforceability of arbitral class 
 
companies escape class actions, so long as they do so by means of arbitration 
agreements . . . . This is a game-­???????????????????????? (quoting Brian Fitzpatrick, Vanderbilt 
University Law School)). 
 5.  131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 6.  See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access 
to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
will impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class 
actions . . . .??;; Steven Berk, EBay Offering Rare Chance to Opt-­Out of Forced Arbitration, 
http://perma.cc/DAN4-­?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
nearly every company that provides consumer goods or services, from Amazon to Verizon, now 
requires users to agree to an arbitration clause. Companies are wasting no time in taking 
advantage of the opportunity to smother those pesky class action suits before they even have a 
??????? ??? ??????????? Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-­Action Suits, 
http://perma.cc/A7UG-­M792 (sfgate.com, archived M???????????????????????????????????????????????
is hard to imagine any company would not want its shareholders, consumers and employees to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Will Federal Consumer 
Bureau Ride to the Rescue of Class Actions?, http://perma.cc/533S-­KA7G (blogs.wsj.com, archived 
????? ???? ?????? ???????-­action bans are already pretty common in certain industries, such as 
consumer credit and cell phones, and they are about to become much more common, lawyers 
say.??. 
 7.  Myriam E. Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012). 
 8.  Ian Millhiser, ????????????????????????????????????????? ???????-­Corporate Decision 
Since Citizens United, http://perma.cc/QK52-­NSGZ (thinkprogress.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 9.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 10.  Id. at 2309?10. 
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waivers.11 Reiterating the refrains about Concepcion, commentators 
quickly decried Amex ??? ??? ????????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ???????
Supreme Court arbitration decision ever.?12 They ?????????? ??? ????
rash of companies issuing arbitration clauses that preclude class 
?????????13 
These empirical predictions are based on two seemingly self-­
evident assumptions. The first is that, after Concepcion and Amex, 
every business will benefit from using an arbitral class waiver to avoid 
class actions. Businesses want to avoid class actions, and on this view, 
there is no downside to using an arbitral class waiver to accomplish 
that end. The writings of Myriam Gilles exemplify this first 
assumption: 
I regard it as inevitable that firms will ultimately act in their economic best interests, 
and those interests dictate that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure to class 
??????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ????? ???? ???????? ???????? ????? ???????? ??????????? ????
recognition, it will become malpractice for corporate counsel not to include such clauses 
in consumer and other class-­action-­prone contracts.14 
The second assumption is that business parties can easily and 
unilaterally change consumer contracts. Consumer contracts are not 
like negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties, which may be 
????????????????????????????????. Gilles makes this assumption explicit 
??? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ???
response to or anticipation of litigation outcomes, revealing a nimble 
??????????????????????????????????????15 
 
 11.  But see infra note 70. 
 12.  Paul Bland, Worst Supreme Court Arbitration Decision Ever, http://perma.cc/AKS6-­
3UGR (publicjustice.net, archived Mar. 10, 2014);; Jean Sternlight, American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant Guts Enforcement of Federal Laws, http://perma.cc/M95B-­4T29 
(indisputably.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 13.  Matt Brownell, Forced Arbitration: Killing the Right to Sue Big Companies, One TOS 
Agreement at a Time, http://perma.cc/ET99-­????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
the court does indeed rule in favor of American Express, look for even more businesses to find 
????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????? ????????????? In Court Rulings, Roberts Takes Long-­Term 
Approach, http://perma.cc/H5W5-­??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????join up with other people to do 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????;; Sternlight, supra 
note 12. 
 14.  Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-­Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005);; see also Myriam Gilles, Gutting the 
Vindication-­of-­Rights Challenge to Arbitration Agreements, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
?????? ?????????????????? ???????????? ????? ??????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????? ???????
will be the first to be held liable for failing to insert an arbitration clause banning all aggregate 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????supra note 7, at 629 (same). 
 15.  Myriam Gilles, ???????? ????? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ????????r-­??????????
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 846 (2012);; 
see also Sternlight, supra note 6, at 718 (????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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It has now been more than two years since the decision in 
Concepcion, long enough to evaluate, at least preliminarily, how 
contracting practices have changed in response to the decision. This 
paper is the first to study empirically the extent to which businesses 
switched to arbitration after Concepcion. As the basis for our study, 
we examine two samples of franchise agreements: one sample of 
leading franchisors in which we track changes in arbitration clauses 
since 1999 and one broader sample of franchisors focusing on changes 
since 2011, immediately before Concepcion was decided. 
Commentators have strongly urged franchisors, like consumer 
businesses and employers, to switch to arbitration clauses after 
Concepcion.16 Indeed, franchisors were among the first businesses to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????17 
Moreover, franchise agreements exemplify a rare type of standard 
form contract. They are publicly available in a systematic way, and a 
reasonably lengthy history of the contracting practices is available. 
While our results are limited to franchise agreements and may not be 
generalizable to consumer and employment contracts, they 
 
will be quite easy to insert class action waivers into small-­print documents or online provisions 
????? ????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? supra note 13 
??????? ????? ???? ????????????????????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ???????????? ???????? ?????
their contracts, because people are used to skipping the terms of service agreements and fine 
??????????????????????????????????????? 
 16.  Judy Rost et al., Comparative International Perspectives of Arbitration in the 
Franchising Context, 31 FRANCHISE L.J. 124, 126 (2012) (??????????????????????????????????????
reason for franchisors to include an arbitration provision is as a potential means to avoid class 
???????????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ??????????? ??? ????: Its Impact on Franchise Law, 
http://perma.cc/5KF4-­2AQX (lexology.c????????????? ????????????????Concepcion, when applied to 
franchise agreements, grants franchisors the authority to draft much stronger language even 
??????????????????????????????????? ?????-­it or leave-­???? . . . . Franchisors should contact counsel 
and sharpen their pencils. If there was ever a time to test the boundaries of the fine print, the 
?????????????????????????????Franchise Law Update: Protecting a Franchisor Against the Risk of 
System-­Wide Class Actions, http://perma.cc/4QRF-­WW3R (foxrothschild.com, archived Mar. 10, 
2014): 
[T]he AT&T decision ends this debate [over the pros and cons of arbitration], at least 
for franchisors and companies that provide contractual services to consumers, since it 
is now clear that a franchisor may both mandate arbitration of franchisor-­franchisee 
disputes and preclude classwide arbitrations. This can effectively eliminate the risk of 
a class action by franchisees against a franchisor. The AT&T decision now makes a 
well-­drafted arbitration clause an essential feature of every franchise agreement;;  
Kemp Sawers & Paul Russell, Franchise Report: Avoiding Class Arbitrations, 
http://perma.cc/9P2V-­HGA4 ??????????????????????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????????
should not assume that the absence of express language authorizing class arbitration immunizes 
the franchisor from class treatment. Instead, the safe course of action for franchisors is to include 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 17.  Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 141, 141 (1997). 
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nonetheless provide valuable evidence on how at least some 
businesses are responding to Concepcion.18 
Our central finding is consistent across both samples of 
franchise agreements: the predicted tsunami of arbitral class waivers 
has not occurred. The use of arbitration clauses in franchise 
agreements has increased since Concepcion, but not dramatically, and 
most franchisors have not switched to arbitration. The reason is not 
that all franchisors were already using arbitration before 
Concepcion.19 Indeed, less than one-­half or two-­thirds of franchisors 
(depending on the sample) used arbitration clauses in their standard 
form contracts immediately prior to Concepcion.20 Franchisors had 
plenty of room to switch to arbitration, but they have not done so in 
any substantial way. 
Given our finding that only a handful of franchisors have 
switched to arbitration clauses since Concepcion, the next question is, 
??hy not?? We examine the two assumptions underlying the 
predictions of a tsunami of arbitration clauses and find reason to 
question both. First, by using an arbitration clause, businesses do 
more than simply contract out of class actions: they contract for a 
bundle of dispute resolution services, including a very limited right to 
appeal. For businesses that perceive themselves as unlikely to be sued 
in a class action, and hence to receive little benefit from an arbitral 
class waiver, the other services bundled with the waiver of class 
actions may discourage them from using an arbitration clause. We call 
 
 18.  Our findings are consistent with preliminary results released by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau on changes in the use of arbitration clauses in credit card and 
checking agreements since Concepcion. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 54?57 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/Y244-­5FTM (finding only a 
slight increase in the use of arbitration clauses);; see infra text accompanying notes 154?58. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that other industries might have shifted more strongly toward 
arbitration since Concepcion. Thus, Microsoft, Sony, and other software and online companies 
have announced since Concepcion that they were adopting arbitration clauses in their end-­user 
license agreements. We seek to reconcile these anecdotal reports with our empirical findings 
later in the paper. See infra text accompanying notes 159?72. 
 19.  By comparison, the limited empirical evidence on the use of arbitration clauses by 
mobile-­wireless-­services providers suggests that almost all facilities-­based operators already use 
arbitration clauses, in which case of course one would not expect a major move toward 
arbitration by such businesses. See Christopher R. Drahozal & ????? ?? ???? ?? ???????
Unbundling Procedure, 66 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (finding that 11 of 12 facilities-­based 
operators used arbitration clauses). 
 20.  See supra text accompanying notes 18?19;; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, ???????? 
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 727 (finding that 45% of franchise agreements 
contained arbitration clauses in 1999);; Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There 
a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 95 (2008) (finding that 43.7% of franchise 
agreements contained arbitration clauses in 2007). 
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the costs resulting from these bundled services ?????????? ??????? 
Second, even standard form contracts might be ?sticky??that is, 
?????????? ??? ??????? ????? ??? ??????? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????
interest. We find empirical support for both possible explanations for 
why many businesses have not switched to arbitration clauses after 
Concepcion.21 
We then consider the potential implications of Amex for the 
future use of arbitration clauses. Of course, if all businesses switched 
to arbitration because of Concepcion, Amex likely would have little 
additional effect. But given our finding that such a switch has not 
occurred, the question then is, ??ow is Amex likely to affect 
contracting behavior?? If businesses have not switched to arbitration 
clauses because of post-­Concepcion uncertainty over the enforceability 
of arbitral class waivers, Amex largely removes that uncertainty. The 
expected result would be an increased use of arbitration clauses. If, 
however, businesses have not switched to arbitration clauses for 
reasons other than legal uncertainty, Amex will not make arbitration 
more attractive. Other characteristics of arbitration (such as the 
???????? ?????? ??? ???????? ?????? ???????? ????????????? ?????????? ???? ???
switch. To the extent these bundling costs deter the use of arbitral 
class waivers, businesses still might not switch to arbitration. 
Likewise, to the extent contract stickiness explains the limited switch 
to arbitration, Amex will have limited effect. 
That said, Amex might actually make an alternative to arbitral 
???????????????????????????nonarbitral ??????????????????????????????
than before. Nonarbitral class waivers are waivers of class actions 
that are not part of an arbitration clause.22 The parties remain in 
court but waive class actions by contract. Nonarbitral class waivers 
clauses are not as common as arbitral class waivers, but they do 
exist.23 Although on its facts Amex addresses the enforceability of 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
nonarbitral class waivers. Indeed, in our view, Amex might be better 
understood not as a case about arbitration clauses but as a case about 
class actions. Read broadly, Amex could be construed as making class 
actions waiveable even without the use of an arbitration clause. 
Nonarbitral class waivers are beneficial for businesses because they 
avoid the bundling costs of an arbitral class waiver: businesses can 
avoid class actions but can otherwise litigate in court (maintaining full 
 
 21.  For another possible reason, see infra note 82. 
 22.  We elaborate on the importance of this technical distinction in Part II. 
 23.  See infra text accompanying notes 198?99. 
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appeal rights, for example). Of course, even after Amex, much legal 
uncertainty remains about the enforceability of nonarbitral class 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? of such waivers. 
But on the margin, this broad interpretation of Amex makes 
nonarbitral class waivers more attractive and might increase their use 
(an increase that was occurring even before Amex, at least in franchise 
agreements). 
This Article and its findings are important for a number of 
reasons. First, and most obviously, the findings call into question 
some of the empirical predictions following Concepcion and Amex. So 
far, it is simply not true that all or even most businesses are switching 
to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. To be clear, however, whether 
businesses have broadly switched to arbitration clauses with class 
waivers is not the same question as whether courts have applied 
Concepcion to dismiss claims seeking class relief in court, or even 
whether Concepcion (and Amex) might result in the end of consumer 
and other contract-­based class actions. We offer no views here on how 
courts have applied Concepcion, and we readily acknowledge that the 
businesses most likely to be subject to class actions, or at least that so 
perceive themselves, are the ones most likely to use arbitral class 
waivers.24 
Second, the Article cautions against unquestioning acceptance 
of the common parade-­of-­horribles arguments marshaled in 
courtrooms around the nation, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States. At a high level of abstraction, this argument typically 
takes the following form: if the court decides the case in a certain 
manner, an avalanche of undesirable behavior will surely follow. In 
the specific context of contract cases, the argument unfolds in this 
???????? ??? ???? ?????? ????????? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????
contract, similarly situated firms will flock to the approved language, 
often to the detriment of other constituencies like consumers or 
employees. In whatever context, though, arguments of this sort 
ultimately entail predictions about human (or firm) behavior. At the 
time those predictions are advanced, they should have some empirical 
foundation. Yet often they do not. Moreover, after the court decides 
the case, those predictions should be tested empirically. Yet often they 
are not. Not only does this state of affairs sully the quality of legal 
argument, it risks the court basing its decision on an invalid empirical 
premise. 
 
 24.  Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card 
Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 540 (2012). 
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Third, the Article offers ????????????????????????????????????????
recent decision in Amex might affect contracting behavior. Although 
on its facts Amex involves the enforceability of an arbitral class 
waiver, the ???????? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ????????????
class waivers, at least as to certain federal statutory claims. There 
are, however, important differences between arbitral and nonarbitral 
class waivers that might affect firm behavior. Unlike arbitral class 
waivers, nonarbitral class waivers likely remain subject to state 
unconscionability challenges. That is because Concepcion is based on 
the FAA and therefore is limited to arbitral class waivers. But for 
businesses that want to avoid the bundling costs of arbitration (e.g., 
retain the right to appeal in court), nonarbitral class waivers would 
become more attractive after Amex. Thus, for a firm that favored the 
most airtight class waiver, an arbitral class waiver might make sense;; 
for a firm that favored a greater opportunity to appeal an adverse 
decision, a nonarbitral class waiver might make more sense. 
Fourth, this Article clarifies the nature of arbitration as a 
means of resolving disputes. An arbitration clause is an agreement to 
a bundle of dispute resolution services?a party-­appointed judge, less 
discovery, a limited right to appeal, and the like. Litigation provides 
its own bundle of services. And while parties can modify the litigation 
and arbitration bundles by contract, there are limits. For some 
parties, all aspects of the arbitral bundle may be preferable to all 
aspects of the litigation bundle. For others, some arbitral 
characteristics may be advantageous while others are not, but the 
advantages may outweigh the disadvantages. For still others, the 
disadvantages of arbitration ???? ????????? ???? ???????????????? ???
one of those advantages is avoiding class actions. Stated otherwise, 
one cannot assume that parties will choose arbitration on the basis of 
only one characteristic without considering the entire bundle. 
Fifth and finally, this Article provides insights into the nature 
of contract change and innovation. Specifically, it draws on prior 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
might be sticky. We examine several explanations for why contract 
terms might be sticky and consider how those explanations apply 
when the contracts involve parties occupying unequal bargaining 
positions. There certainly is reason to expect a degree of stickiness in 
franchise agreements, and we indeed find some evidence of stickiness 
in the contracts we studied. But the evidence does not exclude the 
possibility of other explanations for the lack of a shift to arbitration by 
franchisors, such as the bundling theory suggested above. This Article 
also gives reason to question whether a Supreme Court decision 
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upholding a particular contract provision necessarily is a sufficient 
???????????overcome contract stickiness. 
Part II of the Article provides background on the use of 
arbitration clauses as class action waivers, as well as on the 
Concepcion and Amex decisions. Part III discusses the economics of 
arbitration and standard form contracts, considering both the bundle 
of dispute resolution services provided in arbitration and the 
????????????? ??? ????????? ??????? ????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????? ????
methodology, and presents our empirical analysis. Part V examines 
Amex??? possible implications for the use of arbitral and nonarbitral 
class waivers. Finally, Part VI summarizes our conclusions and sets 
out the implications of our empirical findings. 
II. CONCEPCION, AMEX, AND THE USE OF  
ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
We begin with terminology and some history. Although many 
??? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????
??????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ???????? ????????????? ???????????
addressing class relief in arbitration clauses are class arbitration 
waivers, not class action waivers.25 The arbitration clause itself has 
the effect of avoiding class relief in court because the parties instead 
have agreed to arbitrate any dispute.26 The additional waiver 
language precludes the arbitration from proceeding on a class basis, 
hence the term ??????????????????????????? 
In this Article, we refer to the combined effect of an arbitration 
????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????????27 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contract provisions designed to waive the availability of a class action 
in court without using an arbitration clause. Nonarbitral class waivers 
 
 25.  Although sometimes an arbitration agreement will include a nonarbitral class waiver 
in the event the arbitration clause is invalidated. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke 
Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 29?30), available at 
http://perma.cc/P84G-­PGYE. 
 26.  See, e.g., ??????????????????????????????????????????????????, 1999 WL 35304, at *6 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1997);; Hunt v. Up North Plastics, 980 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D. Minn. 1997) (granting the 
?????????????????????????????????????????;; Ex Parte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So. 2d 6, 10 n.3 
?????? ?????? ??[A] rule of civil procedure providing for class actions cannot overcome binding 
arbitration agreements.??. 
 27.  For examples of prior uses of the phrase, see Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class 
Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 786 (2012) (referring to a clause as an 
??????????????????????????see also Sternlight, supra note ??????????????????????????????????? 
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are much less common but do exist, particularly in the franchise 
setting.28 Finally, we refer to both types of provisions collectively as 
class action waivers.29 
Because the history of arbitral class waivers has been detailed 
at length elsewhere,30 we provide only a brief overview here. We 
reiterate the highlights of the events leading up to Concepcion in 
Section II.A and then discuss Concepcion itself in Section II.B. Finally, 
in Section II.C, we consider the Amex case and its importance for the 
enforceability of class action waivers. 
A. Arbitration Clauses and Class Actions 
Franchise lawyers were among the very first to recognize that 
an arbitration clause could reduce their clients? risks of facing class 
actions.31 In a 1997 article in the Franchise Law Journal, attorney 
 
 28.  See infra text accompanying notes 198?99. 
 29.  ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????supra note 14, 
at 375?76;; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration, 
and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 276, 270?80 (2009) (explaining 
different usages). 
 30.  See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 
SW. L. REV. 47, 51?56 (2012);; Sternlight, supra note 15, at 705?07;; Jean R. Sternlight, As 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 53?78 (2000). 
 31.  For other early publications making the same point, see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. 
Levin, Excuse Me, b????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????7 
BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 1998, at 24, 26 ?????????????? ??? ?? ????????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???????
lawsuits against lenders because the great weight of authority holds that arbitrations cannot be 
?????????? ??? ?? ?????? ?????? ??????? ???? ???????? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????;; Michael R. Pennington, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Business of One Health Insurer, 28 BRIEF 46, 52 ??????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????????
exposure in general, and exposure to class actions in particular, many insurance companies in 
Alabama are presently working to sustain the use of arbitration clauses in insur??????????????????
J.T. Westermeir, How Arbitration Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action Damages: Strategies for 
Managing Risks of Litigation, 14 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 1, 1. Kaplinsky 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Arbitration Is Here to 
Stay and One Lawyer Says That Is Good for Consumers, http://perma.cc/TLR8-­V63P (forbes.com, 
archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
  Reported case law reveals a variety of class action risks faced by franchisors. For a 
sampling, see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984) (common-­law and disclosure 
claims under state franchise law);; Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 729 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(common-­law claims and violations of state wage and labor laws);; Fantastic Sams Franchise 
?????? ??? ????? ???? ? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????
??????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ???????-­law claims);; 
Bridgefund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(common-­law claims and violations of state franchise-­investment law);; see also infra note 59 
(collecting post-­Concepcion cases where class waivers are challenged in franchise agreements). 
We are grateful to Bob Scott for highlighting the importance of this proposition to our argument. 
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Jack Dunham explained that franchisors faced a heightened risk of 
class actions and concluded that ????????????? ????? ??? ??bitration 
clause in their franchise agreements have an effective tool for 
????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????32 The arbitration clause, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????33 
At the time, many courts refused to order arbitration to 
proceed on a class basis. The arbitration clause itself thus ?shield[ed?? 
franchisors from class actions.34 Even so, some franchisors (and other 
businesses) began coupling their arbitration clauses with provisions 
precluding arbitration from proceeding on a class basis.35 These class 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.36 The issue in 
Bazzle was whether the FAA preempted the South Carolina Supreme 
???????? ????????? ??????????? class arbitration.37 The U.S. Supreme 
Court was sharply divided, with the plurality concluding that the 
issue of whether an arbitration clause permitted class arbitration was 
for the arbitrator to decide.38 
In response to Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association 
??????? promulgated rules for administering class arbitrations.39 The 
 
 32.  Dunham, supra note 17, at 141. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See, e.g., Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
class action was unavailable because arbitration is an agreement between the parties);; Champ v. 
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ordering class arb??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????But 
see Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613 (1982) (granting deference to the trial court to 
consider a class-­wide arbitration as it would a motion for class certification), ?????? ??? ??????
grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984);; Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. 
??????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????? ?????????-­wide arbitration may be ordered when the 
arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in 
??????????????vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 35.  See Drahozal, supra note 20, at 731?32. 
 36.  539 U.S. 444 (2003). It is not just parties or commentators that make empirical 
predictions. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444 (2003) (No. 02-­?????? ????? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ????? ???????
significance, because isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will 
prohibit class ??????????? 
 37.  539 U.S. at 447 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). A companion case involved a decision by 
the arbitrator that arbitration could proceed on a class basis. Id. at 453?54 (Breyer, J., plurality 
opinion). 
 38.  Id. at 452?53 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment 
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????? ??????????? ???????????? ????
Court. Id. at 454?55 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
 39.  Am. Arbitration A??? ?? Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, http://perma.cc/ 
3QBG-­RQGP (adr.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014). JAMS has also promulgated class arbitration 
rules. See JAMS, JAMS Class Action Procedures, http://perma.cc/MZ5T-­U37S (jamsadr.com, 
archived Mar. 10, 2014).  
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AAA indicated that it would administer a class arbitration as long as 
the parties had agreed to arbitrate under any set of AAA rules and the 
????????????????????????????????????? class arbitration, consolidation, 
or joinder.40 Following the Bazzle plurality, the AAA class arbitration 
?????? ?????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???? ??? ??????? ??? ?? ????????
????????????? ??????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ???????
permits the arbitration ??? ???????? ??? ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ?? ???????41 
The arbitration proceedings would then be stayed to permit any party 
to seek court review of the clause construction award. Assuming the 
arbitrator construed the agreement as permitting class arbitration, 
subsequent steps in the process track Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 on class actions (i.e., the arbitrator would decide whether to certify 
a class42 and then would proceed to adjudicate the merits).43 Since 
promulgating its rules, the AAA has administered over 350 class 
arbitration proceedings.44 
In only a handful of AAA clause construction awards (7 of 135, 
or 5%) did the arbitrators decide that the arbitration clause did not 
permit class arbitration.45 In the vast majority, the arbitrators 
construed the clause as permitting class arbitration (95 of 135, or 
70%), or the parties stipulated that it did so (33 of 135, or 24%).46 
Seeking to avoid class arbitration, businesses increasingly included 
class arbitration waivers in their contracts.47 In turn, consumers, 
employees, and franchisees challenged the enforceability of those class 
arbitration waivers, most commonly (although not exclusively) on the 
ground that the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable.48 
 
 40.  ???????????????????????AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, http://perma.cc/HN5R-­Q7TX 
(adr.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014):  
[T]he American Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration 
pursuant to its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying 
?????????? ?????????? ????? ????????? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????? ?????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims. 
 41.  ???????????????????????supra note 39, R. 3. 
 42.  Id. R. 4?5.  
 43.  Id. R. 7?8.  
 44.  See Gregory A. Litt & Tina Praprotnik, After Stolt-­Nielsen, Circuits Split, but AAA 
Filings Continue, 27 MEALEY?S INT?L ARB. REP. 1, 1 (2012) (charting AAA class arbitrations filed 
between 2003 and 2012). 
 45.  Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party 
at 22, Stolt-­Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds ????? Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See infra text accompanying notes 147?48. 
 48.  See infra text accompanying notes 50?54. In addition, arbitration clauses also were 
challenged on the ground that they precluded the claimant from vindicating his or her statutory 
rights. See infra text accompanying notes 60?62. 
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Businesses responded by arguing that the FAA preempted that 
argument. The issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.49 
B. Concepcion and FAA Preemption 
The Concepcions were cell phone customers of AT&T Mobility 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??????50 The AT&T cell phone agreement included an 
arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver but also provided 
that ????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ?????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from the customer;; and if the customer recovered more in arbitration 
????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????
receive a minimum of $7,500 (a so-­called bonus payment) plus double 
????????????????51 
When the Concepcions filed a class action on behalf of all 
similarly situated cell phone customers, AT&T filed a petition to 
compel arbitration. The trial court and the Ninth Circuit held that, 
under California law, the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable 
and not severable from the rest of the arbitration clause.52 The lower 
??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???????? ?????????????
application of its unconscionability doctrine.53 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA preempted 
state court decisions invalidating arbitral class waivers as 
unconscionable. Applying state unconscionability doctrine so as 
effectively to require class arbitration, the Court concluded, 
?????????????? ????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????54 
 
 49.  ???? ?????? ?????? ????? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ???? ???????? ????????? ???
Concepcion was laid by Stolt-­Nielsen, in which the Court vacated a class arbitration award on 
the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012) 
(permitting vacatur of arbitral award when arbitrators exceed their powers). 
 50.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Laster v. T-­Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), ??????????????., Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 
2009), ?????????????., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 53.  E.g., Laster, 584 F.3d at 857?59. 
 54.  AT&T Mobility LLC., 131 S. Ct. at 1748. According to the Court, class arbitration is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the principal advantage of arbitration?its informality?and makes the process slower, more 
c??????? ???? ????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ???? ???????
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The decision in Concepcion has been extremely controversial 
and widely criticized.55 Although a handful of courts have sought to 
limit the decision to its facts?in other words, to arbitration clauses 
with a bonus provision and other sorts of pro-­consumer provisions that 
the AT&T clause had56?most have not done so.57 On the first 
anniversary of Concepcion ?????????????????????????????????????????????
76 court decisions had applied Concepcion to stay or dismiss a 
????????? ?????? ????????58 Courts have applied Concepcion to uphold 
arbitral class waivers in a variety of contracting contexts, including 
franchise agreements.59 
After Concepcion, plaintiffs continued to challenge arbitral 
class waivers on the ground that the lack of class relief precluded the 
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights (so-­called 
effective-­vindication challenges). Building on dicta in a number of 
Supreme Court arbitration cases, plaintiffs argued that arbitral class 
waivers amounted to impermissible prospective waivers of statutory 
rights and hence were unenforceable.60 If parties cannot waive a 
 
arbitration requires ??????????? ???????????? ???? ???? ??????? ???????????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ???
?????????????Id. at 1751?52. 
 55.  See supra text accompanying notes 2?8. 
 56.  See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 652, at *8 (Super. Ct. 2011) 
(distinguishing Concepcion on ground that, unlike the AT&T Mobility clause in Concepcion, 
??????? ????? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ??????? ????????? ???????tion of all 
disputes, even those that could not possibly justify the expense in light of the amount in 
??????????????????? , 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013). 
 57.  See, e.g., Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 09CV1951, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
48237, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (applying Concepcion even when arbitration clause did not 
???????? ??????? ??????????);; Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, No. 8:10-­CV-­2463-­T-­33TGW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49231, at *15?16 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2011) (same);; Zarandi v. Alliance Data Sys. 
Corp., No. CV10-­8309DSF(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54602, at *4?5 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) 
(same). 
 58.  CHRISTINE HINES ET AL., JUSTICE DENIED ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS 
FROM THE SUPREME COURT?S CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/5WQ5-­????? ???????????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ??????
Concepcion and held that class action bans with?????????????????????????????????????????? 
 59.  See, e.g., Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 180?81 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(upholding the validity of an arbitral class waiver in a franchise agreement);; Green v. 
????????????? ??????? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ?????????????? ???????????????? ???????
Inc., No. C08-­02993JSW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134945, at *10, *21?23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 
2012) (same);; Villano v. TD Bank, No. 11-­CV-­6714, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123013, at *8 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 29, 2012) (same). 
 60.  E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-­Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79, 89?90 (2000) ??????????????
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively 
vindicating her federal statutory rights . . . .???? see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-­??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue 
to serve both its remedial ?????????????????????????? 
1 - RutledgeDrahozal PAGE (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2014 3:04 PM 
2014] ????????????????????????????? 971 
 
statutory right directly,61 they should not be able to do so indirectly by 
using an unfair arbitration clause. A common basis for an effective-­
vindication challenge is that that the up-­front costs of arbitration are 
too high.62 But that challenge has been made against other provisions 
in arbitration clauses as well, and after Concepcion, it became the 
primary basis for challenging arbitral class waivers. 
C. Amex and the Effective Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights 
The effective-­???????????? ?????????? ???????? ??? arbitral class 
???????????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant.63 The plaintiffs in Amex were merchants 
that accepted American Express charge cards. They brought a class 
action alleging that ????????? ?????????? sales and pricing practices 
violated federal antitrust law. ????????? ?????????? ????????? ?????
merchant agreement included an arbitration clause with a class 
arbitration waiver, and American Express sought to compel individual 
???????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? The merchants opposed 
individual arbitration on the ground that proof of the antitrust claim 
was so expensive that the claim could only be brought economically as 
a class action. Enforcing the arbitral class waiver would prevent them 
from effectively vindicating their statutory rights under the antitrust 
laws. 
The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but 
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class arbitration waiver 
was unenforceable.64 After reconsidering its decision in light of both 
Stolt-­Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and Concepcion, 
the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision.65 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.66 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????recited that 
the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration clauses, and it ????????????
contrary congressional command [that] requires us to reject the 
waiver of ?????? ???????????? ??????67 Nothing in the antitrust laws 
 
 61.  ??? ?? ????????? ??????? ??? ?? ?????????? ??????? ??? ????? ?? ????????? ?????????? ????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 62.  E.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90. 
 63.  133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309?10 (2013). 
 64.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 315?16 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 65.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), ????? sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013);; In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 
F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), ???? ????????? In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 219?20. 
 66.  Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
 67.  Id. at 2309. 
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(which, the Court pointed out, were enacted before adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) precludes the waiver of class actions. 
????? ????? ?????????????? ????????? ?? ????? ????? ???? ?????? ???ted, 
??????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???
??????????????????68 
Second, the Court noted that it had only recognized the 
effective-­vindication doctrine in dicta. But even assuming that the 
argument was available, the Court found it unavailing: 
[T]he exception finds its origin in the desire ??? ???????? ????????????? ??????? ??? ??
??????? right to pursue ???????????????????? That would certainly cover a provision in an 
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would 
perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as 
to make access to the forum impracticable. The class-­action waiver merely limits 
arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more elimina????????????????????????????
pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action 
for legal relief in 1938. Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered 
????????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????????????? ?f a federal right before adoption of class-­
??????? ??????????? ???? ???? ????????? ??????? ????????????? ????????????? ????? ??????
adoption.69 
By rejecting the effective-­vindication challenge, Amex resolved 
much of the remaining legal uncertainty over the enforceability of 
arbitral class waivers, at least pending future statutory or regulatory 
developments.70 We discuss possible implications of the decision for 
nonarbitral class waivers below.71 
III. BUNDLED DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND STICKY CONTRACTS 
Predictions that most or all businesses will begin using 
arbitration clauses after Concepcion and Amex depend on two key 
assumptions: (1) that there is no reason for businesses not to use 
arbitration clauses, and (2) that businesses can and do readily change 
their standard form contracts in response to favorable court 
decisions.72 In this Part, we evaluate those assumptions by examining 
both the bundle of dispute resolution services that arbitration provides 
and the stickiness of contract terms. 
 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 2310?11.  
 70.  Congress might enact legislation restricting the enforceability of arbitral class waivers, 
although the prospects of any statutory change are slight. In addition, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau has authority to regulate arbitration clauses in consumer financial-­services 
contracts under section 1028(b) of the Dodd-­Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, after it completes its statutorily mandated study. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012). 
 71.  See infra Part V.A. 
 72.  See supra text accompanying notes 14?15. 
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A. The Decision Whether to Use an Arbitral Class Waiver: Arbitration 
as a Bundle of Dispute Resolution Services and the Risk of  
Class Actions 
The first assumption is that there is no reason for a business 
not to switch to an arbitration clause. Businesses want to avoid class 
actions, and they can do so at essentially no cost by using an arbitral 
class waiver. On this view, in other words, the only meaningful 
consequence of using an arbitral class waiver is getting rid of class 
actions. 
But an arbitration clause does more than simply reduce the 
risk of class actions;; it removes the case altogether from a judicial 
forum. By using an arbitration clause, parties agree to use a bundle of 
dispute resolution services?a bundle that includes avoiding class 
actions but has other features as well.73 These features range from 
decisionmakers selected by the parties and procedures paid for by the 
parties to, importantly, a very limited appeals process.74 
For franchisors, the lack of an appeals process is a very serious 
cost ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????75 As 
franchise lawyer Martin Fern explains: 
There has long been a debate among lawyers regarding the pros and cons of arbitration 
in general and in the franchise context in particular. The principal advantages of 
arbitration include informality, lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability 
to choose expert arbitrators to resolve specialized disputes. The principal disadvantage 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, supra ????? ???? ??? ???? ???????????? ????? ?????????????
clauses bundle a variety of characteristics?including but not limited to acting as a class action 
waiver?into a single means of dispute resolution. Not all drafting parties will agree to 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 74.  ????????????? ?????? ???????supra note 19. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008), the Supreme Court held that parties could not, by agreement, expand 
the grounds under section 10 of the FAA for judicial review of arbitral awards. The Court left 
open the possibility that such agreements might be enforceable in state court under state 
arbitration laws, and a few states such as California and Texas have enforced these sorts of 
agreements. See, e.g., NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011) (relying on 
Hall St. Assocs. to say the FAA does not preempt enforcement of agreements for expanded 
judicial review of arbitration awards);; Cable Connection Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 
(Cal. 2008) (explaining that the ??????????? ???????????? ????? provision for the enforcement of 
agreements for merits review is consistent with the FAA policy guaranteeing the enforcement of 
private contractual agreements and that the FAA does not require state law to conform with its 
limitations).  
 75.  Arguably, such costs are another cost of Concepcion, although alternatively, one might 
characterize them as costs of court decisions refusing to enforce nonarbitral class waivers?
which result in parties having to choose instead the less efficient arbitral class waiver. See 
????????????? ?????? ???????supra note 19 (explaining that use of class waivers to avoid class 
actions imposes additional costs on parties that are separate from any benefits or costs of 
eliminating class relief).  
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of arbitration is the absence of the availability of multi-­layered appeal which can 
normally be filed to rectify erroneous court decisions, but not arbitration awards. In 
other words, in arbitration, the principal tradeoff against the many advantages is the 
inability of the losing party to correct erroneous decisions by the arbitrator.76 
This cost gives franchisors a very good reason not to use an arbitration 
clause, which at least reduces, if not offsets entirely, any benefit from 
avoiding class actions.77 
By comparison, a nonarbitral class waiver avoids the bundling 
costs of an arbitral class waiver. A party that prefers to have disputes 
resolved in court can do so while still avoiding class actions if it uses a 
clause that affects only the availability of class actions.78 The parties 
still can use public court judges, take advantage of the government 
subsidy to courts, and appeal on much broader grounds than if their 
contract contained an arbitral class waiver. And while nonarbitral 
class waivers are much less common than arbitral class waivers, they 
do exist.79  
Using a nonarbitral class waiver, however, poses greater risks 
of court invalidation. After Concepcion, the FAA provides a 
substantial degree of protection for arbitral class waivers;; nonarbitral 
class waivers have no such federal law backing. As a result, a number 
??? ???????????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ????????
nonarbitral class waivers.80 We discuss the possibility in Part V that 
 
 76.  Fern, supra note 16. Franchisors can mitigate some of the costs of an arbitral class 
waiver by using carve-­outs, excluding claims for which arbitration is particularly ill-­suited from 
arbitration such that the claims will be resolved instead in court. Drahozal & ?? ?????? ???????
supra note 19. But using carve-­outs has its own costs. See id. (explaining that parties incur 
drafting costs to include carve-­outs when they must specify courts in which relief for particular 
claims is to be sought). 
 77.  We acknowledge here the self-­evident point that the consequences of bundling cut both 
ways. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
We do not attempt to disaggregate the actual impact of the incidence of the limited appellate 
right. Rather, our more modest goal is to identify an explanation for why a certain set of 
franchisors might prefer not to use arbitration clauses despite the appeal of the class waiver. We 
thank participants in the Columbia University Law School workshop on the Law and Economics 
of Contracting for their observations on this point. 
 78.  Assuming, of course, that a court will enforce the nonarbitral class waiver. See infra 
text accompanying notes 139?48. 
 79.  See infra text accompanying notes 198?99. 
 80.  See In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 F.R.D. 459, 469?70 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to hold 
nonarbitral class waiver enforceable as a matter of law in commercial case and denying motion 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????;; cf. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 
F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (refusing to enforce forum-­selection clause when 
forum selected does not permit class actions);; Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 699, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same);; Am. Online, Inc. v. Pasieka, 870 So. 2d 170, 171?72 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (same);; Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wash. 2007) (same). 
Compare ??????????????????????????????????? No. 08-­0932, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52025, at *87 
(W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (invalidating nonarbitral class waiver), and ??????? ??? ?????????
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Amex might make nonarbitral class waivers more enforceable. If so, 
nonarbitral class waivers would become more attractive, at least for 
those businesses that have other reasons for not using arbitration 
clauses. 
We are not suggesting that all franchisors will avoid 
arbitration because of the limited right to appeal (or other bundling 
costs of arbitration). But the limited availability of appeals from 
arbitration awards certainly is a consideration on the margin. Nor is 
the limited right to appeal the only reason why a business might not 
use arbitration. Other possible reasons include less effective interim 
measures, the lack of summary adjudication, inefficiencies in 
collection cases, and added uncertainty in the application of otherwise-­
certain legal remedies.81 Instead, our point is simply that, because of 
the bundled nature of arbitration, there are costs to using an arbitral 
class waiver, and these costs provide a reason for some businesses not 
to use an arbitral class waiver even after Concepcion and Amex.82 
At the same time, not all businesses are equally susceptible to 
class actions. As one illustration, a study by the Searle Civil Justice 
Institute found that, while all of the credit card issuers and cell phone 
companies in a sample of AAA consumer arbitrations included class 
arbitration waivers in their arbitration clauses, none of the real estate 
 
Franchising Co., No. 2:06-­cv-­07855-­FMC-­CTx, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109435, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 3, 2008) (same), with ?????????????????????????????????????????-­cv-­02358-­CMA-­KLM, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37702, at *69 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (enforcing nonarbitral class waiver). But 
cf. Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (D. Md. 2000) (concluding that 
unavailability of class actions in chosen forum is no reason to refuse to enforce forum-­selection 
clause) ???????????????????????????????????????A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 2002)(same);; Am. Online, 
Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (same);; Gilman v. 
Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464?65 (Md. 1997) (same). 
 81.  See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 453?57 (2010). This latter point is 
exacerbated by, but not coextensive with, the limited right to appeal. 
 82.  Reputational constraints provide another possible reason businesses might not use 
arbitration clauses with class arbitration waivers, even after Concepcion and Amex. See Gregory 
C. Cook, Why American Express v. Italian Colors Does Not Matter and Coordinated Pursuit of 
Aggregate Claims May Be a Viable Option After Concepcion, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 104A, 109 
(2013):  
It is also a mistake to assert that corporate America will uniformly modify contracts to 
include arbitration. Making changes to an existing contract is not simple or costless. 
Corporate defendants make such changes cautiously and the marketplace can be a 
discipline on contract changes. In other words, corporations may decide not to include 
an arbitration clause for marketing reasons or may decide not to amend their 
contracts because amendment may have a marketing impact. 
Brownell, supra ???????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ????? ??? ?????? ????????????????????? ????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
restrained either by their own g????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? 
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brokerage firms did.83 Presumably real estate brokerages are less 
subject to class actions than mass contracting firms like credit card 
issuers and cell phone companies, and so have less incentive to include 
a class arbitration waiver. 
The same is true even among businesses that use mass 
contracts. Our previous research on the use of arbitration clauses in 
credit card agreements (prior to Concepcion) predicted that, ??????????
the margin, issuers likely will respond to Concepcion . . . by increasing 
?????? ???? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???
??????????? ???? ???? ??? ???????????? ????????? ????????? ????? ?????????????
that all issuers will begin using arbitration clauses are 
?????????????84 Other explanatory factors included the riskiness of 
???? ????????? ??????? ????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????????????? ????
issuer specialized in credit card loans, and whether the issuer was 
mutually owned (i.e., was a credit union).85 
When potential bundling costs of arbitral class waivers are 
taken together with the relatively low risk of class actions some 
businesses face, it is plausible that some businesses might rationally 
decide not to use an arbitral class waiver in their standard form 
contracts. At the very least, this reasoning provides a theoretical 
explanation for the possibility that not all businesses will switch to 
arbitration after Concepcion and thus presents an empirically testable 
proposition. 
B. Arbitration Clauses and Sticky Contracts 
The second assumption underlying predictions of a widespread 
switch to arbitration after Concepcion is that businesses can?and 
do?quickly and readily amend their form contracts in response to 
court decisions. Here we consider the possibility that this assumption 
might not hold. In other words, we examine whether contract terms 
might be sticky. 
The notion of sticky contract terms is hardly new. Numerous 
scholars have examined why parties may be reluctant to alter contract 
 
 83.  Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer 
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 349?50 (2011) (publishing results from Searle Civil Justice 
???????????? ?????????????????????????????? 
 84.  Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 540. Various considerations, such as the size of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of class ???????????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??? ??? ????????????
clause. Id. 
 85.  Id. at 559. 
1 - RutledgeDrahozal PAGE (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2014 3:04 PM 
2014] ????????????????????????????? 977 
 
terms, even when the law might (or clearly does) allow alterations 
that would benefit the parties. This Section reviews that literature 
and examines how it bears on the contracting practice relevant here?
namely, standard form contracts presented on a take-­it-­or-­leave-­it 
basis. We find that several of the traditional explanations for the 
stickiness of contract terms likely do not apply in this particular 
context. We try, therefore, to isolate the likeliest explanations. From 
there, we generate hypotheses in order to ascertain whether (and why) 
franchisors do not always adapt their contract terms to the extent 
permitted or encouraged by Supreme Court decisions. 
1. Possible Explanations for Contract Stickiness 
We do not write on a blank slate. Contracts scholars have 
offered various explanations for the possible stickiness of contract 
terms, and some have provided helpful syntheses of existing 
explanations.86 The literature reveals at least eleven different 
explanations. These include (1) endowment effects, (2) satisficing, (3) 
negative signaling, (4) interpretive risk, (5) overhang, (6) herd effects, 
(7) contract routines, (8) uncertainty, (9) free riders, (10) learning 
externalities, and (11) network externalities. All of these theories, 
moreover, are assessed against the null hypothesis that contracts are 
not sticky. This section explains why several of these theories seem 
unlikely to apply in the adhesive setting, briefly summarizes the 
remaining theories, and then introduces the null hypothesis. 
The first three theories?endowment effects,87 satisficing,88 and 
negative signaling89?do not have much explanatory value in the 
 
 86.  For especially helpful syntheses, see MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND 
A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 33?44 (2013);; 
Omri Ben-­Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
651, 655?60 (2006). For other scholarship on the topic, not cited below, see Stephen J. Choi & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1158 (2006) (discussing reasons why 
sticky contract terms exist);; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How 
Contract Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655, 658?60 (2007) 
(discussing arbitration contract stickiness as a possible reason for why certain clauses include 
one-­sided terms and conflicting providers rules);; Gus De Franco et al., Sticky Covenants 1?3 
(Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-­61, Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 
2288723, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/9XFJ-­UG94 (analyzing the stickiness of bond-­
covenant restrictiveness). See also the articles published by the N.Y.U. Law Review from a 
Conference on Contractual Innovation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1?285 (2013). 
 87.  ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?? ???????
?????? ??? ?????????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ???????? ???????? ??????? ?????????????? See Russell 
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625 (1998);; 
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of 
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1998) (discussing how the initial 
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franchise context. Each of these theories rests on a premise about the 
behavior of the party in the weaker bargaining position that would not 
appear to be valid with franchise contracts. The endowment effect, for 
example, presupposes that the other party attaches a value to a 
contract term in excess of its actual market value (an unlikely 
proposition when a party cannot dicker over the terms). Likewise, 
both satisficing and negative signaling rest on the assumption that 
the parties are actively dickering over the terms of the contract. 
Consequently, these theories appear unlikely to explain stickiness of 
franchise contracts,90 and we do not explore them further. 
The remaining eight theories (as well as the null hypothesis), 
however, might have some explanatory value. Unlike the three just 
discarded, these theories depend on the incentives of a single 
contracting party, even when that party occupies a far superior 
bargaining position. We briefly review the broad contours of these 
theories. 
Interpretive risk. Contracts scholarship tends to conceptualize 
transactional lawyering as a process of identifying and addressing risk 
 
allocation of legal entitlements can affect preference). It might, of course, be the case that 
endowment effects work in the opposite direction. That is, the franchisor (or, more abstractly, the 
party in the superior bargaining position) attaches significance to the chosen form of dispute 
resolution even where, as a matter of rational-­choice theory, another option would be in the 
?????????????????????? 
 88.  The theory of satisficing argues that any individual party has an outcome (or set of 
?????????? ????? ?????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ???????? ???????ual perspective, but achieving that 
optimal outcome may be especially (perhaps prohibitively) costly. See Patrick Bolton & Antoine 
Faure-­Grimaud, Satisficing Contracts, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 937, 938 (2010) (discussing how 
agents write satisficing contracts that do not fully exploit all gains from trade that would be 
available if they faced no deliberation costs). 
 89.  This theory postulates that contracting parties are reluctant to propose changes to 
contract terms because such proposals might convey information to their contract partner. See 
Ben-­Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 651?52 (discussing how parties will not draft out of 
default contract provisions even when better alternatives exist because they fear what it will 
signal to their contracting partner);; Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the 
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J????????????????????????????????????????
default rules, where the default contract rules force a party to reveal information they may not 
wish to reveal to their contracting partner);; Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure 
of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956). 
 90.  There may be exceptions. In some cases, well-­organized associations represent groups 
of franchisees in their relations with franchisors. Under those circumstances, the parties may 
have relatively more equal bargaining positions, and some of the explanations for sticky 
contracts (such as negative signaling) might have more resonance. We thank Victor Goldberg for 
his observations on this point. Moreover, changes may be subject to regulatory oversight. Even if 
the franchisor does not need to dicker with the franchisee, it may incur costs placating a 
regulator.  
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through the design of appropriate contract terms.91 Interpretive risk is 
premised on the idea that the counterparty to a transaction will resist 
changes from preferred language in an industry norm.92 Like 
endowment effects, the notion of interpretive risk assumes that the 
counterparty prefers familiar contract language to unfamiliar 
language. Unlike endowment effects, though, the preference stems not 
from some irrational attachment to the familiar but from the relative 
lower uncertainty that attaches to using a term with an accepted 
meaning in the industry. 
Overhang. Overhang bears a close relationship to interpretive 
risk. It reflects a belief that changes in contract terms will affect the 
interpretation of prior contracts. For example, suppose that a contract 
term X is generally understood to mean that risk passes to the buyer 
once the relevant goods are loaded onto the ship. Suppose further that 
a court later interprets X to mean that the risk passes to the buyer 
only after the goods reach their port of destination. In reaction to this 
judicial decision, the seller considers changing its contracts to replace 
term X with term Y. Term Y somehow makes clearer that risk passes 
to the buyer at the earlier point in the shipment. The buyer proposing 
the inclusion of term Y might imply that preexisting contracts (all of 
which use term X) were understood by the seller, as drafted, to reflect 
the judicial interpretation.93 Ideas of overhang thus are especially 
salient in industries that involve high volumes of contracting whereby 
subtle changes in new contracts could have significant impact on the 
interpretation of a large number of preexisting contracts.94 In 
situations of overhang, as opposed to interpretive risk, the concerns 
over interpretation stem from the party contemplating the change, as 
opposed to the party to whom the change is proposed. 
Herd effects. Closely related to the idea of interpretive risk and 
overhang is the concept of herd effects. This notion stems from the 
insights of psychological research suggesting that certain individuals 
 
 91.  See Weidemaier, supra note 86, at 661, 674 (discussing arbitration providers as 
suppliers of risk management). 
 92.  See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rule Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
59, 71?72 (1993) (discussing how changes from default rules can lead to transaction 
breakdowns). 
 93.  See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2006) (discussing how insurers retain language that is unclear to 
????????????????? ???????? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ??????s interpretation is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? 
 94.  See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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tend to be risk averse.95 Translated into the context of contracting 
practices, the idea of herd effects suggests that lawyers, particularly 
in-­house counsel, engage in risk-­averse behavior by repeating what 
their predecessors have done.96 In doing so, lawyers reduce the 
likelihood that they will be blamed for proposed changes that prove 
????????? ??? ???? ???????? interests. Innovation isolates the 
entrepreneurial lawyer from the herd and thus makes him peculiarly 
vulnerable to blame. Consequently, contract terms remain sticky?not 
because of the costs to the firm (such as with overhang or endowment 
effects) but instead due to agency problems stemming from the 
???????????????????????????? 
Contract routines. Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott systematically 
articulate the concept of contract routines.97 This idea begins from the 
premise that agents, such as lawyers, are working within a complex 
set of contractual structures. No single agent may fully understand 
the relationship between a particular contract provision and the larger 
contractual or commercial structure. Consequently, they are reluctant 
to change a particular term for fear of unwittingly upsetting other 
contractual provisions that may, unbeknownst to the lawyer, have 
some actual (or potential) relationship to the particular term. Like the 
notion of herding, the idea of contract routines roots the explanation 
??? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????????But unlike herding, the agency 
problem lies not in blame avoidance but instead in a simple reaction to 
uncertainty over a complex model and a desire to avoid unintended 
costs to the firm. 
Uncertainty. Gulati and Scott also suggest that contract 
stickiness may be attributable to simple uncertainty.98 Boilerplate 
contracts may have been drafted with a particular allocation of risk in 
mind. As time passes, the ???????????????????intentions are forgotten as 
the drafters themselves move on. So the successors at the firm inherit 
the clauses without the understanding behind them. Successors are 
reluctant to change the clauses not for fear of blame (as with herding). 
Rather, they simply do not know the consequences of the change. 
??????????? ????? ??????? ????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ????
continued use of a contract clause. The theory closely resembles that 
of contract routines with one critical difference: the account grounded 
 
 95.  GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 39;; see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path 
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 354?55 (1996) (discussing risk aversion in lawyers). 
 96.  GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 39, 197 n.23. 
 97.  Id. at 38?39. 
 98.  Id. at 42?43. 
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in uncertainty focuses on the passage of time and the consequent loss 
of personnel who can explain the background risk allocation behind a 
boilerplate term. 
Free riders?? ????? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????? ????? ???
collective action problems.99 Firms would prefer not to undertake the 
cost and investment of innovation if another firm will undertake that 
cost first. If a competing firm does so, then the free-­riding firm can 
take advantage of whatever benefits accrue from the innovation 
without having to bear the cost itself. In the contracting context, the 
theory of free riders would explain stickiness on the ground that firms 
are unwilling to themselves assume the costs of contract innovation. 
Instead, they wait for another firm to do so. They then wait and see 
h??????????????????????????????????????????????????????the new term is 
interpreted in a manner favorable to the firm, then other firms will 
employ the new formulation as well. 
Learning externalities. Pioneered by Marcel Kahan and 
Michael Klausner, the theory of learning externalities (sometimes 
????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? explains 
contract-­term stickiness in terms of the costs associated with 
change.100 To use a noncontract example, a company incurs costs when 
it has used PCs for many years and then shifts its IT department to 
Macs. These learning effects arise from past use of a particular norm 
within a firm. In the context of contracting practices, the consistent 
use of the same contract terms locks in certain benefits to a party. 
These may derive from efficiency in drafting, reduced uncertainty in 
the ambiguity over the judicial interpretation of the term (interpretive 
risk and overhang) and the reduced need to incur ??????????? ????.101 
Accordingly, if ?????-­??? ????????? ????? ?????? around a regularly used 
contract term, switching terms surrenders those savings and thus 
forces firms ??? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? they develop similar 
synergies from the new term.102 When the lock-­??? ???????? utility 
exceeds the ???? ??????? utility, the theory of learning externalities 
suggests that the contract term will remain sticky. 
Network externalities. Kahan and Klausner also hypothesize 
that network externalities may cause some contract stickiness. 
 
 99.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 100.  Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
???????????????????????????????????????????????, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719?25 (1997). 
 101.  See Ben-­Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 659?60 (discussing how externalities 
might be the cause of stickiness in default terms). 
 102.  Florencia Marotta-­Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in 
Consumer Standard-­Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 246 (2013). 
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Network externalities capture savings that accrue due to the use of a 
common term within an industry or network. To take a noncontract 
example, the use of compatible telephones yields benefits to individual 
firms within an industry.103 In contrast to learning effects, network 
effects derive from the contemporaneous use of an industry norm. In 
the contractual setting, the use of a familiar term may reduce the 
costs of legal representation, since companies need not invest in 
educating a lawyer about a familiar term.104 Industry-­wide 
standardization can also result, thereby reducing contracting costs for 
repeat players within the industry. Unlike learning externalities, 
which result from costs attributable to changes within the firm, 
network externalities result from costs attributable to departure from 
accep??????????????????????????????????????????? 
Null hypothesis. Finally, these existing accounts must be tested 
against the null hypothesis?also identified by Scott and Gulati?that 
stickiness is a myth.105 The null hypothesis, in other words, states that 
firms do in fact innovate and respond to changes in the legal 
landscape. Under this account, change may not occur instantaneously. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
terms evolve as a result of shocks, such as a judicial interpretation of a 
contract term, or some other innovation.106 After ???????????????????????
shocks,? firms experiment with new terms.107 David Hoffman explains: 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exemplary. Decisions like AT&T v. Concepcion (validating class-­
arbitration waivers) . . . could have spurred attorneys to consider 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????108 In response to 
 
 103.  Ben-­Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 660. 
 104.  Sometimes, contracting agents can ameliorate these effects. For example, underwriters 
and law firms can undertake the front-­end investment to change a particular norm within the 
industry. Not only do these agents absorb these costs (which can then be spread across industry 
players), but they can serve to bridge the disparate interests of firms within the industry and roll 
out a new industry standard which firms then replicate. 
 105.  GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 43. 
 106.  Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2013);; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 929?30 (2004). 
 107.  Hoffman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 41) (citing Choi et al., supra note 106). In the 
?????? ??????? ????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ???????????? ????????? ????????? ????? ??????? ????
change. Id. Only af???? ???? ?????????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????Id.  
 108.  Id. (manuscript at 43?????????????????????????????????????????????????? should expect 
that even if the Supreme Court were to validate particular new forms of bespoke 
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those shocks, contract terms will change over a period of time when 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
This section has reviewed the prevailing accounts for why 
contracts are sticky, stripped away those theories least likely to apply 
in the franchise context, and introduced the null hypothesis?that 
contracts are not sticky but respond, albeit sometimes slowly, to 
systemic shocks. In the next Section, we map these accounts onto the 
particular types of contracts in our study. 
2. Stickiness and Franchise Contracts 
In the preceding Section, we explained why certain theories of 
the stickiness of contracts are less likely to apply in the adhesive 
setting. In this Section, we both explain why franchise contracts might 
be stickier than other standard form contracts and how consideration 
of a Supreme Court decision like Concepcion permits us to test the 
proposition. 
Franchise contracts might be stickier than other standard form 
contracts for several reasons.109 First, franchise agreements have 
higher stakes than virtually all consumer contracts.110 The higher 
stakes may induce franchisees to read franchise agreements more 
carefully and invest more in understanding the ????????????terms.111 
 
procedure . . . many contracts would still remain silent about what should happen if the parties 
??????????????Id. (manuscript at 44). 
 109.  Prior scholarship has demonstrated that credit card agreements can be modified 
through the simple act of conveying the modification by means of a bill stuffer or electronic 
communication followed by some period for the consumer to opt out (or, alternatively, accept the 
proposed modification by conduct through the use of the card). See David Horton, The Shadow 
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605, 609 (2010) 
(discussing the factors that prevent consumers from opting out of contract amendments). Insofar 
as this is true?again, we do not independently test the validity of the proposition in this 
Article?this premise too casts doubt on several theories. In particular, overhang theory lacks 
much explanatory value under this condition of easy modification. Under conditions where 
contracts are easily modified, the bank can simultaneously alter the terms for future 
transactions as well as the terms governing the repayment of debts for prior transactions. 
(Again, while overhang risk can be reduced, it cannot be eliminated entirely. Consider a company 
that is in litigation over the meaning of term A. If, during the litigation, it proposes to modify 
that term, the proposed modification still carries overhang risk in the pending litigation.) 
 110.  See Adam B. Badawi, Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from 
Franchising, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 743, 753 tbl.3 (2010) (reporting average start-­up cost 
in sample of franchise agreements of $571,170, with range across types of franchise from low of 
$55,150 for home-­care franchises to high of $5,459,643 for lodging franchises). 
 111.  By comparison, some scholarship, including empirical research, suggests that 
consumers often do not read their contracts. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-­40, 2009), available at 
http://perma.cc/N34E-­DE3Z (examining the extent to which buyers read standard form 
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Second, franchise agreements tend to have longer terms than 
consumer contracts.112 The ability to turn over only a fraction of the 
total stock of contracts in any given year necessarily affects the 
????????????? incentives to modify its contracts. Not only does it take 
time for the parties (or the franchisor) to realize fully the benefits of 
the new contract terms, but during the interim, the franchisor faces 
the prospect of nonuniform contract terms, which elevates other risks 
(e.g., overhang).113 Third, franchise agreements are more heavily 
regulated than many consumer contracts. State franchise laws provide 
for disclosure requirements, substantive regulation, and agency 
oversight, which may increase the stickiness of franchise agreement 
terms.114 (This last feature of franchise agreements may impose a form 
of network externality, albeit one created by public regulation rather 
than a privately developed industry norm.) 
Evaluating the impact of a Supreme Court decision like 
Concepcion enables us to test the relative stickiness of contracts like 
franchise contracts. This feature affects several of the explanations 
described in the preceding section. The free rider explanation offers a 
good example. By definition, if a matter has reached the Supreme 
Court (or any court at all, for that matter), at least one firm has 
chosen to innovate its contract terms. Thus, at least some of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d?they 
can now free ride on the investment of the innovating firm. 
Even after one firm innovates, however, follow-­on firms might 
remain reluctant to change their contract language. The innovating 
 
contracts). For a literature survey, see Clayton P. Gillette, Standard Form Contracts 5?7 (N.Y.U. 
Law Sch. Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-­18, 2009), available at 
http://perma.cc/F5DB-­L5XJ?type=pdf (papers.ssrn.com, archived May 8, 2014). Assuming this is 
valid (we do not attempt to make an original contribution on that question), this phenomenon 
suggests that several other explanations described in the previous section lack much explanatory 
value here. For example, there would not be much of a concern about negative signaling because 
???? ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????
language. For similar reasons, interpretive risk, endowment effects, and satisficing again lose 
som?? ???????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ????? ????????? ??????????again 
assuming the validity of this proposition?casts doubt on the explanatory value of theories that 
assume parties have symmetrical information and actually perceive the signal sent by a 
proposed modification. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 824 (2006). Franchise agreements seem likely to differ from 
consumer contracts in that the stakes are much higher, and franchisees are more sophisticated 
contracting parties than consumers. 
 112.  See Badawi, supra note 110, at 753 tbl.3 (reporting average term in sample of franchise 
agreements of 12.3 years). 
 113.  See supra text accompanying notes 93?94 (discussing overhang). 
 114.  See generally Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-­Informed? 
Revisiting the Debate over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193 (2013). 
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firm bears not only the cost of altering its contract language but also 
the risk that, in litigation, the language may actually harm its 
interests. Consider, for example, the arbitral class waiver: a court 
might find that the FAA does not preempt a state law rule 
invalidating the class waiver. 
But once the Supreme Court rules, the free rider account 
suggests that firms should adapt. At this point, much?though 
admittedly not all?of the residual litigation risk has dissipated.115 
Consequently, follow-­on firms should be more inclined to adopt the 
??????????? ??????? ???? ??ntract language. On the other hand, if 
contract terms remained sticky even after the intervening Supreme 
Court decision, this would cast doubt on the validity of the free rider 
theory (at least for the class of cases we are studying). Thus, our focus 
on Concepcion carries force for a variety of explanations that explain 
stickiness in terms of agency problems or risk avoidance. These 
include not only the free rider theory but also theories like 
uncertainty, contract routines, and herd effects. We are interested less 
in what particular explanation for stickiness does or does not apply 
than in at least some explanation for stickiness possibly holding, 
which certainly is the case. We leave distinguishing among these and 
other possible explanations for contract stickiness for future research. 
To summarize the preceding two sections, the salience of the 
accounts for contract stickiness depends critically on the sort of 
contract under study. For the type of contract we are studying 
(adhesive contracts) and the phenomenon we are studying (the effect 
of intervening Supreme Court decisions), theories that presuppose 
parties of equal bargaining power (or at least parties in a position to 
react to changes in contract language) largely drop out. These include 
theories like endowment effects, satisficing, and negative signaling. 
By contrast, theories that depend on firm-­specific behavior?like free 
riders, herd effects, learning externalities, contract routines, and 
 
 115.  We acknowledge that there will be residual litigation risk over the scope of the 
?????????????????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ????????????????? ????
example, the AT&T arbitration clause at issue in Concepcion. A follow-­on firm might adopt some 
but not all of the incentives contained in the AT&T clause;; in that case, it bears a residual risk 
that a lower court, even after Concepcion, would conclude that this lack of incentives 
distinguishes the instant clause from the AT&T clause. Alternatively, a follow-­on firm in another 
state might mimic completely the AT&T clause. In that case, it still bears a residual risk that a 
lower court could construe the applicable unconscionability doctrine in a manner differently from 
?????????????Discover Bank rule (the rule at issue in Concepcion holding that the presence of the 
class waiver in the arbitration clause rendered the clause per se unconscionable). It might 
???????? ????????? ????? ???? ???????? ?????????????????? ????????? ???? not sweep as broadly as the 
Discover Bank rule and, therefore, was not preempted by the FAA. See infra text accompanying 
notes 184?86. 
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uncertainty?remain more relevant. And of course, all of these 
theories are tested against the null hypothesis. With this theoretical 
background, we turn to our hypotheses. 
C. Hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses targets the prediction that 
Concepcion will result in most or all businesses using arbitration 
clauses in their standard form contracts. Those predictions are subject 
to question both because using an arbitration clause does more than 
contract out of class actions and because contracts may be sticky. 
Accordingly, the first set of hypotheses tests the basic assumptions 
about firm behavior that animate criticisms of decisions like 
Concepcion: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Many or most firms that did not use 
arbitration clauses prior to Concepcion will not switch to 
arbitration after the decision. 
 
Hypothesis 1A. The firms most likely to switch to 
arbitration clauses are ones that previously switched 
away from arbitration or otherwise are on the margin 
between arbitration and litigation. 
 
If the data support these hypotheses, the next question is, ??hy have 
firms not switched to arbitration?? The second set of hypotheses 
considers the two possible explanations we have suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Using arbitral class waivers is not costless 
because arbitration is a bundle of dispute resolution 
services, not just a class action waiver. To the extent 
this is true, firms will not switch to arbitration after 
Concepcion, especially firms that face little risk of class 
actions or place a high value on court procedures, such 
as the right to appeal. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The use of a dispute resolution clause (or 
lack of one) is sticky. The accounts of stickiness suggest 
that if a firm previously does not use an arbitration 
clause, then they would not be affected by a Supreme 
Court decision, even if the Supreme Court decision 
might encourage the use of such a clause. 
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Hypothesis 3A. A modified version of this hypothesis, 
building on Stephen Choi and ????? ????????? ??????? ???
??????? ???????? suggests that the use of arbitration 
clauses should increase over time. As Supreme Court 
decisions like Concepcion ??????? ???????? ?? ???????
network, the firm will eventually invest the resources 
necessary to make a change.116 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
In this part, we present the results of our empirical study of 
changes in the use of arbitration clauses since Concepcion. Examining 
two samples of franchise agreements, we find evidence of at most a 
slight shift to arbitration following Concepcion and certainly not the 
tsunami predicted by some commentators. We begin by describing our 
data and methodology. We then present our basic findings and seek to 
reconcile those basic findings with other reports about the use of 
arbitration clauses after Concepcion. We conclude with evidence on 
whether the limited move to arbitration can best be explained by the 
stickiness of franchise agreements or by the nature of arbitration as a 
dispute resolution process. 
A. Data and Methodology 
A number of states?including Minnesota, which is the source 
for the franchise agreements studied here?require franchisors to file 
?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ????? ????
sell franchises in the state.117 The standard form franchise agreement 
 
 116.  Possible questions for future research include, to the extent stickiness appears to be 
playing a role, which theoretical explanations for contract stickiness seem to be at play. For 
franchise agreements, our discussion of the literature suggests limited explanatory value of 
several theories in the context of franchise contracts (including negative signaling, interpretive 
risk, endowment effects, network externalities, and satisficing). This leaves learning 
externalities, overhang, herding, free riders, contract routines, and uncertainty. These varying 
theories give rise to possible hypotheses, such as the following: if free rider theory or herding 
explained stickiness, we would expect to see more change after the Supreme Court blessed a 
clause than beforehand;; if learning externalities explained stickiness, then we would expect to 
see more change among larger firms than smaller ones;; and if contract routines or uncertainty 
explained the stickiness of terms within arbitration clauses, then we would expect to see more 
change among agreements that had simpler (i.e., shorter) clauses. 
 117.  Franchise Registration Information, http://perma.cc/APZ5-­UDUM (mn.gov, archived, 
Mar. 10, 2014). For discussion of the representativeness and other uses of the Franchise 500 as a 
source of data for research on franchises, as we do here for the cross-­section sample, refer to 
Drahozal, supra note 20, at 723?????????????????? ?????? ???????supra note 19.  
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(typically redlined to indicate any changes from the previous year)118 
is attached to the FDD. In almost every case, the franchisor used a 
standard form franchise agreement with state-­specific addenda to 
address differences in state law. Accordingly, the fact that we obtained 
the franchise agreements from Minnesota should not affect the terms 
of the agreements we studied. 
We used two samples of franchise agreements. The first 
consists of franchisors that were among the top franchise 
?????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????? 1999 Franchise 500 
?????????????????????119 The sample originally consisted of seventy-­five 
franchisors;; due to business attrition, our current sample now is sixty-­
seven franchisors.120 For these franchisors, we collected the dispute 
resolution clauses from their franchise agreements in 1999, 2007, 
2011, 2012, and 2013,121 which enables us to track changes in the 
dispute resolution clauses over time?including before and after 
Concepcion. 
In addition, we collected franchise agreements from a random 
sample of franchisors that filed an FDD with the Minnesota 
Department of Commerce both before and after Concepcion (the 
??????-­???????? ?????????122 The cross-­section sample consists of 214 
franchisors and does not overlap with the panel sample;; none of the 
franchisors in the panel sample is in the cross-­section sample.123 For 
 
 118.  N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS?N, INC., 2008 FRANCHISE REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE 
GUIDELINES pt. II(C)(1) (July 1, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/7JP8-­6WWH (nasaa.org, 
archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 119.  2013 Franchise 500, http://perma.cc/WG5W-­DVSE (entrepreneur.com, archived Mar. 
10, 2014). 
 120.  The franchisors no longer in the sample include ones that went out of business, merged 
into other franchisors, or apparently stopped doing business in Minnesota.  
 121.  For a description of the data collection for the 1999 agreements, see Drahozal, supra 
note 20, at 722?26;; for a description of the data collection for the 2007 agreements, see Drahozal 
& Wittrock, supra note 20, at 90?94. 
 122.  We began with a sample 239 franchises and then excluded 25 franchisors that did not 
make filings in Minnesota in 2013. Of the excluded franchisors, one switched to arbitration 
between 2011 (i.e., before Concepcion) and 2012 (i.e., after Concepcion), and one switched away 
from arbitration. 
 123.  The proportion of arbitration clauses in our cross-­section sample might be affected by 
our sampling of agreements filed with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. If, for example, 
we had instead selected a random sample of franchisors that filed in California, where courts 
have been less willing to enforce arbitration clauses, we might find a smaller proportion of 
franchise agreements with arbitration clauses before Concepcion. But that bias should decrease, 
if not largely disappear, after Concepcion and Amex. Moreover, as noted above, while California 
also makes FDDs available online, exemptions from the California franchise-­registration statute 
exclude most established franchisors from the filing requirement, thus biasing the sample in a 
different way. By comparison, our panel sample was selected from a national list of franchisors 
and should not be subject to significant geographic biases. 
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the cross-­section sample, we collected the dispute resolution clause as 
it was immediately before the decision in Concepcion (i.e., prior to 
April 27, 2011) and the dispute resolution clause in franchise 
agreements filed after Concepcion.124 This dataset gives us a broader 
view of how franchisors are responding to Concepcion, but without the 
historical context. 
As indicated, for both samples, the dispute resolution clauses 
were collected from the franchise agreements filed with the Minnesota 
Department of Commerce.125 Prior to 2010, franchise agreements were 
only available on paper from the Minnesota Department of Commerce. 
For 2011 through 2013, we collected the FDDs online from the 
Department?? website and then extracted information about the 
franchise agreement from the FDD.126 The FDD also serves as the 
data source for the number of franchised units of the franchise.127 We 
give little emphasis to the number of franchised units in our analysis, 
however, because of various uncertainties in that data.128 The 
franchise agreement in the FDD typically is redlined to show changes 
from the prior year, so we are able to examine the extent to which 
franchisors change their franchise agreements.129 
As noted above, using franchise agreements as a source of data 
has advantages over other form contracts. The agreements are 
publicly available and have been for a number of years, making 
 
 124.  For simplicity in data collection, we treated franchise agreements filed with the 
Minnesota Department of Commerce on or before April 30, 2011, as filed before Concepcion. But 
we also verified that the dispute resolution clauses in those agreements had not changed since 
the previous version, usually sometime in 2010. 
 125.  On a handful of occasions, when the agreement was not available from the Minnesota 
Department of Commerce, we obtained a copy of the franchise agreement from a database 
maintained by the California Department of Corporations. California Electronic Access to 
Securities & Franchise Information, http://perma.cc/Q5DC-­2SN6 (corp.ca.gov, archived Mar. 10, 
2014). While including mor?? ??????? ?????? ??? ???????????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ???? ????????
coverage of franchisors because established franchisors are generally exempted from filing in 
California. Id. 
 126.  Welcome to CARDS?Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents Search, http:// 
perma.cc/S35J-­RK64 (cards.commerce.state.mn.us, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 127.  Item 20 of the FDD reports this information. For 1999, the data were derived primarily 
from the Franchise 500, and occasionally we used the Franchise 500 as the source for more 
recent years to maintain consistency or to fill gaps.  
 128.  First, it is not clear that the number of franchises is an appropriate proxy for size of the 
franchise chain because number of units does not necessarily correlate with total sales. Second, 
some franchisors may report in the FDD only the number of units of the type of franchise they 
are selling at the particular time, not the total number of units of any type in the chain. Third, 
franchisors report the number of units as of the end of their fiscal year, which varies by 
franchisor. 
 129.  See infra text accompanying notes 179?80. 
1 - RutledgeDrahozal PAGE (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2014 3:04 PM 
990 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:4:955 
 
available a reasonable degree of historical information.130 We 
recognize the limitations of using franchise agreements, however, 
which we discuss at length below.131 Because of those limitations, our 
findings here may not be generalizable to other settings in which 
standard form contracts are used, such as consumer and employment 
contracts. In Section IV.B.3 below, we attempt to reconcile our 
findings here with other reports of changes in arbitration clause usage 
following Concepcion.132 
B. Changes in the Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion: 
Empirical Findings 
In this Section, we report our empirical findings on changes in 
the use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements following 
Concepcion. We find: 
 
? In the panel sample, the use of arbitration clauses increased 
from 40.3% of franchisors immediately before Concepcion to 
44.8% by 2013 (Hypothesis 1). Of the four franchisors that have 
switched to arbitration since Concepcion, three had used 
arbitration clauses at some point prior to the decision and 
switched back afterwards, while the fourth used arbitration to 
resolve some disputes before Concepcion and expanded its use 
to all disputes afterwards (Hypothesis 1A). 
 
? In the cross-­section sample, the net use of arbitration clauses 
increased only slightly after Concepcion, with 62.6% of 
franchisors using arbitration clauses before Concepcion and 
63.6% after the decision. Five franchisors actually switched to 
arbitration after Concepcion, but four others switched away 
from arbitration, resulting in a net increase of one (Hypothesis 
3). 
 
? In the panel sample, the use of class arbitration waivers by 
franchisors using arbitration clauses has increased 
substantially since 1999, with most of the increase coming 
before 2011. In 1999, 51.6% of franchisors with arbitration 
clauses also used class arbitration waivers. By 2011, 
 
 130.  See supra text accompanying notes 121?24.  
 131.  See infra text accompanying notes 149?52. 
 132.  See infra text accompanying notes 153?72. 
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immediately before Concepcion, that percentage had increased 
to 77.8%, with an additional increase to 86.7% by 2013 
(Hypothesis 3A). 
1. Changes in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements 
Contrary to the predictions that all businesses would soon use 
arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts after Concepcion, 
we find only a slight change in the use of arbitration clauses in both 
samples of franchise agreements. 
In the panel sample, as shown in Table 1, the percentage of 
franchisors using arbitration clauses increased slightly, from 40.3% in 
2011 immediately before Concepcion to 41.8% in 2012 and 44.8% in 
2013.133 As a percentage of total franchises, the amount of the shift 
was similar (from 50.4% of franchises in 2011 to 52.5% of franchises in 
2012 and 53.7% of franchises in 2013).134 One franchisor switched to 
arbitration in mid-­2012, two more in late 2012 and mid-­2013, and a 
fourth later in 2013. Interestingly, in all four cases, the franchisor had 
had prior experience with arbitration. In 1999, GNC included an 
arbitration clause in its franchise agreement but by 2007 had switched 
to a forum-­selection clause. It then switched back to arbitration after 
Concepcion, and indeed, many provisions in its current arbitration 
clause were identical to those in the 1999 agreement. The pattern for 
the Rent-­A-­?????? ???????????????????? ????????????????????? ????????
arbitration clause in 2007 to a forum-­selection clause in 2011 and then 
back to arbitration in late 2012. Although not identical, the Rent-­A-­
Wreck arbitration clause in 2012 bears many similarities to the one 
????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ????? ???? ????
disputes;; prior to 2013, it used arbitration for some disputes and not 
others. And Kahala Corp. (the franchisor for Blimpie sub shops) 
switched back to arbitration in 2013 after having switched away from 
 
 133.  Because Concepcion was decided in April 2011, we measure each year after the decision 
as beginning in April. So when we refer to 2012, we mean the year from April 2011 to April 2012, 
2013 is the year from April 2012 to April 2013, and so on. At the time this article went to press, 
only very partial data for the year April 2013 to April 2014 were available because most 
franchisors file their FDDs at the end of March. As a result, we do not include data for 2013?
2014 in the tables. We do note in the text, however, that one additional franchisor switched to 
arbitration between April 2013 and when the article went to press. If we calculated the 
percentage of franchisors using arbitration clauses by assuming that all franchisors that had not 
yet filed their FDDs would keep their dispute resolution clause unchanged, the percentage of 
franchisors using arbitration clauses would have increased to 46.3% (31/67) for 2013?2014. 
 134.  Data for 2013?2014 are largely unavailable as yet, as discussed above, so we do not 
include those data here. See supra note 133. Also, data for one franchisor are missing for 2010?
2011. 
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arbitration in 2008.135 Stated otherwise, these franchisors were all on 
???? ??????? ???????? ???????????? ???? ???????????????? ??????? ????
switched away from arbitration or used it for some disputes?and so 
were among the most likely to switch to arbitration following 
Concepcion. 
 
Table 1: Change in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise 

































The panel sample also permits us to examine changes in the 
use of arbitration clauses ????? ?? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????????????? ???
1999. Figure 1 summarizes the results.136 It reveals a slight, long-­term 
decline in the use of arbitration clauses by franchisors from 1999 
through 2011, which apparently reverses after the decision in 
Concepcion.137 Our findings thus might understate the effect of 
Concepcion on the use of arbitration clauses, because without 
Concepcion, the downward trend might have continued. Stated 
otherwise, Concepcion not only might have induced some franchisors 
to switch to arbitration, but it also might have induced some 
franchisors to continue using arbitration who otherwise might have 
switched away from arbitration. That distinction, however, is 
immaterial for the predictions we test here. 
 
 
 135.  See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 20, at 97 n.124 (noting the removal of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 136.  As discussed supra note 133, one additional franchisor switched to arbitration at the 
end of the third quarter of 2013. We do not report overall percentages for the year 2013?2014 in 
Figure 1 because most of the data for that period was not available at the time this article went 
to press. Given the one switch to arbitration, however, and assuming the franchise agreements 
for which data are missing remain unchanged, the percentage of franchise agreements using 
arbitration clauses is now up to 46.3% (i.e., back to its level in 1999). 
 137.  The percentages differ slightly from those reported for 2007 by Drahozal & Wittrock, 
supra note 20, at 95, for two reasons: first, because our sample has declined to 68 franchisors 
from the 71 in that study;; and second, because we were able to add one franchisor (which 
switched away from arbitration) for that year which previously was unavailable. 
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Figure 1: Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements, 
1999?2013 
 
In the cross-­section sample, the overall percentage of 
franchisors using arbitration clauses was higher than in the panel 
sample, as shown in Table 2,138 but that percentage changed only 
slightly between 2011 and 2013. In 2011, before Concepcion, 134 of 
214 franchise agreements, or 62.6%, included arbitration clauses. In 
2013, after Concepcion, 136 of 214 franchise agreements, or 63.6%, 
included arbitration clauses. The very slight shift in the aggregate 
masks some reshuffling among franchisors: five franchisors in fact 
switched to arbitration by 2013, but those changes were largely offset 
 
 138.  These findings are consistent with William L. Killion, An Informal Study of Arbitration 
Clauses Reveals Surprising Results, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 79, 79 (2002) (finding higher rate of 
arbitration clauses by franchisors ranked lower in Franchise 500). 
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by three franchisors that switched away from arbitration during the 
same period. 
 
Table 2: Change in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise 





























Finally, Figure 2 shows the percentage of franchisors using 
arbitration clauses that also use class arbitration waivers.139 In 1999, 
barely half (51.6%) of franchisors using arbitration clauses also used 
class arbitration waivers. By 2011, the percentage had increased to 
77.8% and then to 86.7% in 2013. The use of class arbitration waivers 
(in franchise agreements, at least) has therefore increased 
significantly in the past fifteen years.140 
But even so, not all franchise agreements with arbitration 
clauses include class arbitration waivers. This result is surprising 
because the costs of adding a class arbitration waiver to a contract 
with an arbitration clause would seem much lower than the costs of 
adding both an arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver to a 
franchise agreement that has neither. Although the benefits of 
avoiding class actions would be the same as we described before, the 
 
 139.  In other words, the denominator for the calculations in Figure 2 differs from the 
denominator in Figures 1 and 3. Both Figures 1 and 3 present the percentage of franchisors, 
including those that use arbitration clauses and those that do not. Figure 2 presents the 
percentage of only those franchisors that use arbitration clauses. 
 140.  ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? arbitration waivers] over 
??????????????????????????supra note 15, at 853. She reaches this conclusion by comparing the use 
of class arbitration waivers in a nonrandom sample of recent arbitration clauses to the use of 
class arbitration waivers reported by studies examining consumer contracts across a range of 
industries. Id. at 853 n.104. Although the conclusion she reaches is consistent with our findings 
here, her methodology is problematic because she is not comparing the same types of contracts. 
For example, the Searle study (one of the studies to which she compares her data) found that all 
or almost all credit card and cell phone contracts in the sample included class arbitration 
waivers but that no real estate brokerage contracts did. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 83, at 
349?50. Gilles does not examine any real estate brokerage contracts, so her results might simply 
be due to her comparing different types of contracts rather than any change over time. 
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bundling costs identified previously do not apply to the decision to 
include a class arbitration waiver in an existing arbitration clause. 
We can identify at least three explanations for this less-­than-­
ubiquitous use of class arbitration waivers.141 First, it may be evidence 
of contract stickiness (Hypothesis 3). Franchisors simply may not have 
revised their franchise agreements to include class arbitration waivers 
even though it would seem beneficial for them to do so. Second, 
franchisors may fear, even after Concepcion, that using a class 
arbitration waiver might result in the invalidation of their arbitration 
???????? ?????? ???? ???????? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ?he Second 
Circuit in Amex, though, any such risk has declined substantially.142 
But during the time period studied, there remained some risk that a 
court would invalidate an arbitration clause with a class arbitration 
waiver on an effective-­vindication theory.143 Third, given the Supreme 
???????? ????????? ??? Stolt-­Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.,144 franchisors might believe that using a class arbitration 
waiver is not necessary. In Stolt-­Nielsen, the Court held that a clause 
????? ???? ????????? ??? ?lass arbitration could not be construed as 
authorizing class arbitration.145 That said, arbitral tribunals 
continued construing clauses without class arbitration waivers as 
authorizing class arbitration even after Stolt-­Nielsen,146 and franchise 
lawyers continued to recommend that franchisors use class arbitration 
waivers.147 Accordingly, we find this third possible explanation 
unlikely. 
The explanations explored in the foregoing paragraph all treat 
franchisors as interchangeable. Another set of explanations might 
differentiate among franchisors, either with respect to their resources 
or their interests.148 For example, large franchisors (measured by sales 
 
 141.  By comparison, 93.6% of credit card issuers using arbitration clauses covering 99.9% of 
credit card loans outstanding used class arbitration waivers as of December 31, 2010. Peter B. 
Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39.  
 142.  133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).  
 143.  See supra text accompanying notes 119?29. 
 144.  559 U.S. 662 (2010);; see also Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2069?70 
(2013) (limiting Stolt-­Nielsen to its facts).  
 145.  Stolt-­Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 & n.10.  
 146.  Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1103, 1157?58 (2011). 
 147.  Sawers & Russell, supra ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
absence of express language authorizing class arbitration immunizes the franchisor from class 
treatment. Instead, the safe course of action for franchisors is to include a class arbitration 
?????????????????????????????????? 
 148.  Research on the use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements suggests such 
firm-­specific explanations, see Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 539?40 (observing that 
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or number of franchised units) might display a greater tendency to 
favor arbitration clauses, coupled with class waivers, to the extent 
they perceive themselves to be litigation targets;; by contrast, small 
franchisors might perceive a lower risk of litigation given that their 
pockets are not as deep. Along the same lines, larger franchisors 
might be more likely to have in-­house legal counsel attuned to the 
most significant changes in the legal landscape (and thus more 
capable of responding quickly to shocks that result in changes in 
contract drafting);; by contrast, smaller franchisors may lack the same 
personnel ranks and, consequently, be less likely to respond to these 
sorts of shocks. Future research might examine such firm-­specific 
explanations. 
 
operational differences among credit card companies explain their decisions whether or not to 
adopt arbitration clauses), as does prior research on the use of arbitration clauses in franchise 
agreements. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and 
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Agreements, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 580?81 (2003) 
(observing that franchisors with large networks and high levels of repeat business are less likely 
to employ arbitration clauses). 
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Figure 2: Use of Class Arbitration Waivers in Franchise 
Agreements with Arbitration Clauses, 1999?2013 
 
2. Caveats 
We recognize and reiterate the limitations of our research. 
Initially, we have only two years of data since Concepcion. While that 
time period would seem to be long enough to detect changes to 
contracts if businesses could in fact quickly and costlessly change their 
contracts, to the extent contracts are sticky, implementing those 
changes may take longer. That may be particularly true for franchise 
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agreements, given their relatively long terms.149 At a minimum, the 
relatively short time frame makes it difficult to distinguish between 
bundling and stickiness explanations for the limited switching to 
arbitration we have observed in franchise agreements. 
Second, franchisors might have anticipated the outcome in 
Concepcion and so already changed their contracts before the case was 
decided. If so, we would not observe a change in the use of arbitration 
clauses after the decision. But our panel sample finds no evidence of 
increased arbitration clause use leading up to Concepcion;; to the 
contrary, the use of arbitration clauses continued its slight, long-­term 
decline up until 2010 and only began to increase after Concepcion.150 
Moreover, even if franchisors anticipated the outcome, fewer than half 
of the franchise agreements that we studied use arbitration clauses, 
despite the predictions that all would do so after Concepcion. 
Finally, and more fundamentally, although often grouped 
together with consumer and employment contracts in policy 
discussions,151 franchise agreements differ in a number of respects 
from those types of standard form contracts. As discussed above, 
franchise agreements have higher stakes, longer terms, and are 
subject to more regulation than the typical consumer or employment 
contract.152 As a result, one must be cautious not to extrapolate too 
broadly from our findings here to other standard form contracts. 
That said, our results at a minimum provide evidence that not 
all businesses have switched to arbitration after Concepcion?even 
businesses that commentators have argued should switch. 
3. Reconciling Our Findings with Other Reports 
As noted above, our findings necessarily are limited to 
franchise agreements, which differ in important ways from other form 
contracts, in particular consumer and employment contracts.153 In this 
Section, we reconcile our findings with other reports of changes in the 
use of arbitration clauses since Concepcion. 
 
 149.  See supra text accompanying notes 112?13. 
 150.  See supra text accompanying notes 136?38. 
 151.  George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. ????? ???? ????? ??????? ???????? franchise 
agreements are lumped together with employment agreements and consumer contracts as 
problematic areas of adhesive bargaining, because franchisees are often small businesses dealing 
with large corporations, and thus lack the bargaining strength to negotiate arbitration clauses in 
??????????? 
 152.  See supra text accompanying notes 109?14. 
 153.  See supra text accompanying notes 17?18. 
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First, on December 12, 2013, the Consumer Financial 
??????????????????????????????????a preliminary report on the results 
of its study, required by the Dodd-­Frank Wall Street Reform and 
????????? ??????????? ????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ????
arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and 
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer 
????????????????????????????????154 ??????????? ???dings on changes in 
credit card and checking account contracts since Concepcion are 
consistent with our findings here: the use of arbitration clauses has 
increased somewhat, but most institutions do not use arbitration 
????????????????????????????????????? incidence of arbitration clauses in 
credit card contracts has increased since Concepcion, but only 
??????????with five credit card issuers adopting arbitration clauses 
after Concepcion and three switching away from arbitration.155 At the 
end of 2012, only 17.0% of credit card issuers, covering 50.2% of credit 
card loans outstanding, used arbitration clauses.156 A few more 
financial institutions have switched to arbitration for their checking 
account agreements: in a sample of large financial institutions, 47.7% 
used arbitration clauses as of summer 2013, up from 39.8% as of 
summer 2012.157 As of summer 2013, however, the CFPB estimates 
????? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ?????????
???????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??????nts representing some 44.4% of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????158 
Second, anecdotal press reports identified various companies 
that have adopted arbitration clauses since Concepcion. The 
businesses typically reported as adopting arbitration clauses after 
Concepcion are computer software companies and online businesses, 
as shown in Table 3.159 
 
 154.  12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012);; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18 
???????????????????????????????????????????? 
 155.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 54 n.125. 
 156.  Id. at 22. 
 157.  Id. ??? ???? ???? ??????? ??????? ????? ????????? ?????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????? ???
arbitration during that one-­??????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????? Id. 
Because of data limitations, the study was unable to examine changes between the date of the 
Concepcion decision and summer 2012. 
 158.  Id. at 25?26. 
 159.  The one exception is Umpqua Bank, which revised its deposit-­account agreement to 
include an arbitration clause after Concepcion. See infra text accompanying note 165. Professor 
Gilles reports that Regions Bank switched to arbitration after Concepcion. Gilles, supra note 15, 
at 853 n.105. By comparison, the Wall Street Journal reports that Regions Bank ??????????????
the existing mandatory-­arbitration provision contained in its deposit accounts????????Concepcion. 
Robin Sidel, No Day in Court for Bank Clients, http://perma.cc/8HL8-­QBQN (wsj.com, archived 
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These businesses are notable because they are in industries 
that, prior to Concepcion, only rarely used arbitration clauses. 
Florencia Marotta-­Wurgler found that almost no software license 
agreements used arbitration clauses or class arbitration waivers in 
her 2007 study,160 a situation that had not changed much prior to 
Concepcion.161 Moreover, at least some of the firms (both Sony and 
Netflix) had been subject to high-­profile class action lawsuits shortly 
before they switched to arbitration.162 Finally, the anecdotal reports 
only highlight the switch to arbitration of several large players in the 
market. Without more systematic data, there is no way to know 
whether arbitration clauses are used by most or all firms in the 
market, or whether these markets resemble the credit card market, in 





????? ???? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ????????????
clauses in credit card and checking account contracts since Concepcion is described supra text 
accompanying notes 154?58. 
 160.  See Florencia Marotta-­Wurgler, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47?48 (Omri Ben-­Shahar 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 161.  Marotta-­Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 102, at 280. 
 162.  Michael Liedtke, Netflix Class Action Settlement: Service Pays $9 Million After 
Allegations Of Privacy Violations, http://perma.cc/6J4D-­PP7T (huffingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 
10, 2014);; Winda Benedetti, Sony Sued, Could Bleed Billions Following PlayStation Network 
Hack, http://perma.cc/FDA3-­R3S4 (nbcnews.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 163.  Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 559?61. 
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Table 3: Press Reports of Firms Switching to Arbitration 






Date Switch Reported 
Sony164 Video games September 2011 
Umpqua Bank165 Deposit account January 2012 
Netflix166 Video rental and streaming March 2012 
Microsoft167 Video games and software May 2012 
Valve168 Computer games July 2012 
eBay169 Online auction September 2012 
PayPal170 Electronic payment service October 2012 
Instagram171 Online photo sharing service December 2012 
StubHub172 Online ticket market February 2013 
 
All told, the markets for online services and computer software 
may reflect a different contracting dynamic than the franchise market. 
The former markets were marked by a low initial usage of arbitration 
 
 164. Mark Milian, Sony: Supreme Court Ruling Spurred Changes to PlayStation Terms 
http://perma.cc/882Q-­BQQZ (cnn.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 165. Brent Hunsberger, Umpqua Bank Joins Wells Fargo and Chase in Requiring Customers 
to Arbitrate Disputes, Barring Class Actions, http://perma.cc/7XLT-­N4L9 (oregonlive.com, 
archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 166. Jordan Crook, ???????? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???
Service, http://perma.cc/U7B2-­8CEL (techcrunch.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 167. Tim Fielden, Microsoft on the Issues: Consumer Product and Service Agreement 
Updates, http://perma.cc/D58D-­NXFD (blogs.technet.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 168. Chris Morran, Video Game Publisher/Seller Valve Now Forcing Customers into 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration, http://perma.cc/XET8-­CFKP (consumerist.com, archived Mar. 
10, 2014). 
 169. Brian Wolfman, New E-­Bay Arbitration Agreements with Its Customers Include Class-­
Action Ban (but with an Opt-­Out), http://perma.cc/H3B2-­63GA (pubcit.typepad.com, archived 
Mar. 10, 2014);; Steven Berk, Ebay Offering Rare Chance to Opt-­Out of Forced Arbitration: Nov. 
9th Deadline, http://perma.cc/LFW8-­Q4R5 (thecorporateobserver.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 170. Greg Blankinship, PayPal Adds Class Action Arbitration Waiver to Its Contract, 
http://perma.cc/WTG9-­TAB8 (classactionblog.mpnsb.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 171. Chris Morran, ??????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ???????????? ???? ???????????? ??????, 
http://perma.cc/V9VW-­EV4T (consumerist.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 172. Chris Morran, Now You Can No Longer File Class-­?????????????????????????????? ??????
How to Opt Out, http://perma.cc/4LZP-­K8C4 (consumerist.com, archived Mar. 11, 2014). 
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clauses, with a number of large firms switching to arbitration after 
both Concepcion and the filing of several high-­profile class actions. By 
contrast, the franchise market had a much higher usage of arbitration 
clauses prior to Concepcion and a slight, but not dramatic, move to 
arbitration after that case. More research into the online services and 
computer software markets would be useful to help provide a better 
understanding of why firms in those markets behaved differently than 
those in the franchise market, both before and after Concepcion. 
C. Are Arbitration Clauses Sticky? 
Given our findings that, at least so far, the predicted switch to 
arbitration has not yet occurred in franchise agreements, the next 
question is, ??hy not?? In our theoretical discussion, we identify two 
possible reasons. The first is that franchisors in fact have business 
reasons not to use arbitral class waivers. By agreeing to arbitrate, in 
other words, franchisors would agree to a bundle of dispute resolution 
services, at least some of which may be undesirable (Hypothesis 2).173 
The second is that form contracts may be sticky (Hypothesis 3). 
As discussed above, there is reason to believe that franchise 
agreements may be somewhat sticky, albeit perhaps less sticky than 
negotiated contracts.174 Our prior research has found evidence of 
stickiness in credit card agreements that continued to list the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
services several years after the NAF had ceased administering 
consumer arbitrations.175 As a result, the agreements risked at best 
court appointment of arbitrators and at worst invalidation of the 
arbitration clause.176 For end-­user license agreements prepared by 
mass-­market consumer software companies, Florencia Marotta-­
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????percent of the 
contracts examined saw at least one standard term change over the 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????177 
They explain that, ????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????
especially in an industry as dynamic as software, the results challenge 
 
 173.  Or perhaps, for reputational reasons, they might decide not to use arbitration clauses. 
See supra note 82. 
 174.  See supra text accompanying notes 14?15. 
 175.  Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 141, at 30. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Marotta-­Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 102, at 274?75. 
1 - RutledgeDrahozal PAGE (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2014 3:04 PM 
2014] ????????????????????????????? 1003 
 
conventional views that a large fraction of consumer fine print is set in 
???????178 
Here, we develop a simple measure of change in franchise 
agreements using the redlined versions of the agreements included in 
the FDD.179 For each franchise agreement for 2011?2012 and 2012?
2013, we counted the number of provisions in the franchise 
agreements that were changed substantively. For example, expanding 
the parties subject to an arbitration clause (e.g., by expressly 
including affiliates) would count as a substantive change. 
Renumbering a provision because the parties inserted a new provision 
earlier in the agreement would not. We included changes to all types 
of provisions of the franchise agreement and counted the number of 
provisions with substantive changes rather than the number of 
substantive changes. If a single provision was changed in multiple 
ways, we counted it only as a single change. This measure of contract 
change necessarily is very approximate;; it is most useful at the 
extremes. Nonetheless, it provides at least a rough measure of the 
extent to which franchisors changed their franchise agreements 
during the years studied. 
Based on the data described above, we categorized each 
franchisor by the number of changes in any particular year and the 
number of years in which changes were made, as shown in Table 4. 
Franchise agreements with ten or more provisions with substantive 
changes in any given year were classified as having major changes. 
Franchise agreements with at least one but fewer than ten provisions 
with substantive changes in any given year were classified as having 
minor changes. If the agreement had changes in only one year, the 
changes were characterized as periodic;; if in both years, they were 
characterized as regular. If there were no substantive changes in 




 178.  Id. at 275. 
 179.  See supra text accompanying note 118. When a franchise agreement did not reflect any 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
whether in fact it was unchanged from the prior year or whether the version of the franchise 
agreement we were using was not redlined.  
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Table 4: Categorizations for Changes to Franchise 
Agreements, 2011?12 & 2012?13 
Category Definition 
Major, regular Ten or more changed provisions in both years 
Major, periodic Ten or more changed provisions in one year 
Minor, regular Some but fewer than ten changed provisions in both years 
Minor, periodic Some but fewer than ten changed provisions in one year 
Unchanged No changes in either year 
 
Table 5 summarizes our categorizations of the changes in the 
panel sample by the type of dispute resolution clause used in the 
franchise agreement in 2012.180 Note first that 53 of the 67 franchisors 
(79.1%) changed at least one provision during the two years we 
examined, and 7 of the 67 franchisors (10.4%) changed ten or more 
provisions in both years. These are higher percentages than Marotta-­
Wurgler and Taylor found for the end-­user license agreements they 
studied, but we use a more generous definition of change than their 
study, so our results are not directly comparable.181 
 
Table 5: Changes in Franchise Agreements by Type of Dispute 
Clause, 2011-­12 & 2012-­13 
Category Arbitration Clause No Arbitration Clause 
Major, regular 4 3 
Major, periodic 12 15 
Minor, regular 7 6 
Minor, periodic 1 5 
Unchanged 6 8 
Total 30 37 
 
 
 180.  Two of the agreements switched to arbitration in 2013. 
 181.  See supra text accompanying note 177. 
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No clear patterns emerge by type of dispute resolution clause 
(or at least none for which we can claim any statistical significance 
because of the small sample size). During the period studied, the 
percentage of unchanged franchise agreements was similar for both 
agreements with and without arbitration clauses. At the other 
extreme, a higher percentage of regular, major changes were made by 
franchisors using arbitration clauses. For those franchisors making 
major changes, either periodic or regular, it seems less likely that 
contract stickiness explains the failure to switch to arbitration. 
Indeed, almost half (18 of 37) of the franchisors not using arbitration 
clauses made major changes to their franchise agreements. Again, we 
cannot draw definitive conclusions, but our data at least suggests that 
something more than contract stickiness explains why some 
franchisors have not switched to arbitration after Concepcion. 
An alternative possibility is that dispute resolution provisions 
are stickier than other contract provisions, so that the data above 
understate the degree of stickiness. We also separately counted the 
number of franchisors that made substantive changes to the dispute 
resolution clause itself, such as by switching to (or from) arbitration, 
or otherwise changing their dispute resolution clause. In 2012, 11 of 
67 (or 16.4%) of franchisors changed their dispute resolution clauses. 
In 2011, 6 of 67 franchisors (or 9.0%) changed their dispute resolution 
clauses. Six of the 11 used arbitration clauses in 2012, while 5 of the 6 
in 2011 did so. Not surprisingly, a smaller percentage of franchisors 
changed their dispute resolution clauses than changed some other 
provision in the franchise agreement. Also as expected, franchisors 
that used arbitration clauses were more likely to change their dispute 
resolution clause, because arbitration clauses tend to be longer and 
more complex than forum-­selection clauses. That said, 6 of 17 (or 
42.1%) of the franchisors that changed their dispute resolution clause 
used forum-­selection clauses in their franchise agreements, suggesting 
that forum-­selection clauses are not necessarily stickier than 
arbitration clauses. 
Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the stickiness of 
franchise agreements partially explains why many franchisors have 
not switched to arbitration since Concepcion. Half of the franchisors 
that do not currently use arbitration clauses made either no changes 
(8 of 37, or 21.6%), or only minor changes (11 of 37, or 29.7%), to their 
franchise agreements in 2011?2012 and 2012?2013. Those franchise 
agreements may be sticky. But a sizable proportion of franchisors that 
do not currently use arbitration clauses made major changes to their 
franchise agreements in one (15 of 37, or 40.5%) or both (3 of 37, or 
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8.1%) of those years. For those franchisors, contract stickiness alone 
does not fully explain why they have not switched to arbitration. 
V. AMEX AND NONARBITRAL CLASS WAIVERS 
Commentators have predicted that ???? ???????? ????????
decision in Amex will result in a new ?rash? of businesses switching to 
arbitration clauses to avoid class actions.182 Of course, if all businesses 
already had adopted arbitration clauses after Concepcion, as some had 
predicted, then Amex would have no additional effect on contracting 
behavior. Given our finding that such a switch has not occurred, 
however, the likely effect of Amex remains open. 
It is too soon to present empirical evidence on the extent to 
which businesses switched to arbitration after Amex. Instead, we offer 
some thoughts on the legal implications of the decision and how those 
implications might affect future contracting behavior. 
A. Legal Implications of Amex for Class Waivers 
In Amex, the Supreme Court held an arbitral class waiver 
enforceable even though the lack of class relief arguably made it 
uneconomical to pursue a federal antitrust claim.183 By foreclosing 
what appears to be the last major avenue to challenge arbitral class 
waivers after Concepcion, the Court in Amex reduced, if not 
eliminated, any residual legal uncertainty about their enforceability. 
In addition, the dissent in Amex, perhaps inadvertently, 
rejected a variation on the effective-­vindication challenge. Some 
courts, typically state courts, had extended the theory to rights arising 
out of state statutes. For example, in Feeney v. Dell, Inc., the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to limit the effective-­
vindication doctrine to federal statutory rights, instead holding that it 
applied to state statutory rights as well.184 ???????????????????????????
Amex, however, made clear that such analysis is erroneous: 
 
 182.  See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 183.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309?11 (2013). 
 184.  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 455?56 (Mass. 2013), ?????? ??? ?????????, 993 
N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013);; see also ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2005) (suggesting that effective vindication of state law is available as ground to challenge 
arbitration agreement);; Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (same);; Gibson 
v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1101 (Ala. 2009) (same). But see Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 
673 F.3d 1155, 11??? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ????????????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ????????
but Mitsubishi, Gilmer, Green Tree ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply standard preemption 
principles, asking whether the state law frustrates the ??????????????????????????????????
the state rule does so?as the Court found in AT&T Mobility?the Supremacy Clause 
requires its invalidation. We have no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in vindicating 
that law. Our effective-­vindication rule comes into play only when the FAA is alleged to 
conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act here. In that all-­federal context, 
one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-­vindication rule 
serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them.185 
Given that even the Amex dissenters would have limited the effective-­
vindication doctrine to federal statutory rights, cases like Feeney 
would seem to be no longer good law.186 
Finally, while on its facts Amex addresses arbitral class 
waivers, the decision might make courts more likely to enforce 
nonarbitral class waivers.187 Stated otherwise, although the decision 
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????188 it is arguably a class action decision more than an arbitration 
decision. 
Most of the reasoning in Amex applies to nonarbitral as well as 
arbitral class waivers. Thus, as the Amex Court points out, the 
effective-­vindication doctrine essentially is an application of the bar on 
prospective waivers of statutory rights.189 If parties cannot directly 
waive a statutory right, they also cannot do so indirectly by using an 
unfair arbitration clause.190 The Court then goes on to hold that an 
arbitral class waiver does not amount to a prospective waiver of a 
statutory right ???????? ??he class-­action waiver merely limits 
arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those 
????????? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????? ????
??????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ??????191 
Nothing in that analysis depends in any way on whether a class 
 
 185.  Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 186.  Of course, Feeney w?????????????????????????????????????????????????????Amex even if it 
had involved federal statutory rights because the basis for the effective-­vindication challenge 
was a class arbitration waiver. The Massachusetts court later acknowledged that its decision 
was incorrect under Amex. Feeney v. Dell, 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013). 
 187.  As noted above, courts currently are split on the enforceability of nonarbitral class 
waivers. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 188.  Bland, supra note 12;; Sternlight, supra note 6. 
 189.  133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 190.  As the Court explains in Amex?? ?That would certainly cover a provision in an 
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps 
cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to 
??????????????????????????Id. at 2310?11.  
 191.  Id. ??????????Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate 
?????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????re adoption of class-­action procedures did 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. 
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waiver uses ??? ???????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????
analysis seems to be that, at the time Congress enacted the antitrust 
laws, class actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not 
yet been adopted. That argument, of course, applies equally to 
nonarbitral class waivers.192 
Clearly, any application of Amex??? ????????? to nonarbitral 
class waivers would rest only on dicta because Amex on its facts 
involved an arbitral class waiver. Moreover, the Court relied on the 
FAA and its own prior arbitration cases at various points in the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????the FAA does, contrary 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the consequence of a class-­????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????193 
And the framework the Court applied to reconciling the FAA and the 
antitrust laws is its usual one for analyzing whether a federal statute 
makes a particular statutory claim nonarbitrable.194 That said, there 
is at least an argument that Amex enhances the enforceability not 
only of arbitral class waivers but also of nonarbitral class waivers. 
B. Arbitral and Nonarbitral Class Waivers in Franchise Agreements: 
Predictions and an Empirical Baseline 
As stated above, it is too early to evaluate empirically the effect 
of Amex on the use of arbitral and nonarbitral class waivers. Instead, 
we offer some predictions about how businesses are likely to respond 
to that case. 
First, to the extent businesses refrained from switching to 
arbitration after Concepcion because of residual legal uncertainty 
about the effective-­vindication doctrine, those businesses might switch 
after Amex. But to the extent businesses avoided arbitration because 
of its limited right of appeal or other bundling costs, one would not 
expect all or even most businesses to begin using arbitration, even 
 
 192.  On this view, an open question after Amex is how to deal with a statutory right arising 
out of a federal statute enacted after the creation of class action procedures under the Federal 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????????? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ????????
framework for nonarbitrability. See id. at 2309?10. Presumably, that framework would not 
apply, at least not directly, to nonarbitral class waivers. 
 193.  Id. at 2312 n.5 (citations omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)). 
 194.  Id. at 2309?10. 
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after Amex.195 Likewise, Amex will have little effect on the stickiness 
of franchise agreements, although over time, the use of arbitration 
might nonetheless increase as firms slowly adopt contractual 
innovations. 
Second, as suggested above, Amex might enhance the 
enforceability of nonarbitral class waivers. But because a nonarbitral 
class waiver does not use an arbitration clause, the FAA would not 
apply. There would be no federal law basis, therefore, for preempting 
state law regulation. As a result, even if Amex does apply to 
nonarbitral class waivers, states should still be able to invalidate 
them as unconscionable (or otherwise regulate those provisions by 
statute, regulation, or court decision).196 Thus, one might expect to see 
varied state approaches to regulating nonarbitral class waivers, much 
as one saw with arbitral class waivers prior to Concepcion.197 
Conversely, unlike arbitral class waivers, nonarbitral class 
waivers should have no bundling costs. The only change to the 
litigation process the parties are making is to waive class actions;; 
other characteristics of litigation (such as the availability of appeals) 
stay the same. As such, businesses that want to waive class actions 
but also maintain their usual appeal rights would, all else equal, 
prefer nonarbitral class waivers. 
Whether the legal uncertainty or the absence of bundling costs 
predominates is an empirical question, and it is difficult to make any 
definitive predictions. As Figure 3 indicates, prior to Amex, 
enforceability considerations appear to have predominated. More than 
twice as many franchisors in the panel sample used arbitral class 
 
 195.  Our hypothesis about arbitration and bundling costs dovetails with some of the 
arguments of Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller about the paucity of arbitration agreements in 
certain business-­to-­business contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight 
from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly 
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. ??????????????????The paucity of such clauses may partially 
reflect the view of corporate counsel that the decision whether to include binding arbitration in 
an agreement is not one that can be made across the board, but rather depends on the needs and 
?????????????? ??? ???? ??????????? Here, however, the bundling costs influence the behavior of a 
single party (the franchisor) as opposed to two equally sophisticated business parties (the subject 
????????????????? ?????????????????? 
 196.  In addition, there might be arguments against the enforceability of nonarbitral class 
waivers in addition to state law unconscionability. See, e.g.?? ???????????????????????????????????
LLC, Civil Action No. 08-­0932, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52025, at *87 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) 
(invalidating nonarbitral class waiver as inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 197.  Cf. ALAN S. KAPLINSKY, SCORECARD ON WHERE FEDERAL AND STATE APPELLATE 
COURTS AND STATUTES STAND ON ENFORCING CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN PRE-­DISPUTE 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 42?43 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/8E8Z-­2GJW 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Concepcion). 
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waivers over nonarbitral class waivers (38.9% versus 16.4% in 
2013).198 The ratio is similar for the cross-­section sample, although the 
use of both arbitral (51.4%) and nonarbitral (18.7%) class waivers is 
higher there than in the panel sample. By comparison, in other 
standard form contracts (such as credit card and cell phone 
agreements), arbitral class waivers overwhelmingly predominate.199 
This result may be due to greater uncertainty about the enforceability 
of nonarbitral class waivers in those settings, or it may suggest that 
bundling costs are lower in those settings, so that there is less benefit 
to using nonarbitral class waivers instead of arbitral class waivers. 
 
 
 198.  The increase in arbitral class waivers and the decline in nonarbitral class waivers in 
2013 offset each other to some extent because of one franchisor that previously used a 
nonarbitral class waiver switching to an arbitral class waiver. 
 199.  David Hoffman finds only a small number of nonarbitral class waivers in credit card 
agreements, all of which appeared in contracts with arbitration clauses. See Hoffman, supra note 
25 (manuscript at 29?30). Arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers clearly are dominant 
in cell phone contracts. See ????????? ??? ?????? ???????supra note 19. 
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Figure 3: Use of Arbitral Class Waivers and Nonarbitral Class 
Waivers in Franchise Agreements, 1999?2013 
 
 
Amex may enhance the enforceability of nonarbitral class 
waivers while leaving their bundling benefits unchanged, making 
them more attractive on the margin. Since 1999, the use of 
nonarbitral class waivers in the panel sample has increased at a faster 
rate than the use of arbitral class waivers. And in both samples, the 
overall use of nonarbitral class waivers is higher than one might 
expect given the limited attention to such waivers by courts and 
academics. Whether the enhanced enforceability as a result of Amex 
will be enough to result in a greater use of nonarbitral class waivers is 
as yet unknown. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
After Concepcion, commentators predicted that all or most 
businesses would soon switch to arbitration clauses. This paper tests 
that prediction and finds it unsupported. Based on our samples of 
franchise agreements, we find only a small switch to arbitration, not 
the tsunami predicted. In the panel sample, the use of arbitration 
clauses increased from 40.3% of franchisors immediately before 
Concepcion to 44.8% in 2013. The four franchisors that have switched 
to arbitration after Concepcion all were on the margin between 
arbitration and litigation: three had used arbitration clauses at some 
point prior to Concepcion and switched back, while the fourth used 
arbitration to resolve some disputes and expanded its use. In the 
cross-­section sample, the net use of arbitration clauses was virtually 
unchanged after Concepcion, with 62.6% of franchisors using 
arbitration clauses before the decision and 63.6% after. Five 
franchisors switched to arbitration after Concepcion, while three 
others switched away, leaving a net increase of one. We also find that 
the use of class arbitration waivers by franchisors already using 
arbitration clauses has increased substantially over time, with most of 
the increase coming before 2011 (from 51.6% of franchisors in 1999 to 
77.8% in 2011, with a further increase to 86.7% in 2013). 
These findings have a number of implications. First and most 
obviously, they call into question some of the empirical predictions 
following Concepcion and Amex. So far, at least, not all or even most 
businesses are switching to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. As 
we have noted before, however, one would expect those businesses 
most susceptible to class actions to be the most likely to switch. 
Second, the Article cautions against unquestioning acceptance of the 
common parade-­of-­horribles arguments often made in litigation. 
Third, the Article adds to our understanding of the nature of 
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. An arbitration clause 
does more than waive class actions. It brings with it other 
characteristics of the arbitration bundle of dispute services, 
discouraging businesses from using arbitration even after Concepcion 
and Amex. Fourth, the Article provides insights into the nature of 
contract change and innovation. We find a significant degree of change 
in franchise agreements among franchisors in the panel sample, 
suggesting that contract stickiness is not the sole reason for the 
limited switching to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. Moreover, 
our findings as to franchise agreements suggest that Supreme Court 
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decisions may not always be the sort of systemic shock likely to result 
in contract change. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s recent 
decision in Amex might affect contracting behavior. Although on its 
facts Amex involves the enforceability of an arbitral class waiver, the 
decision could be read as applying to nonarbitral class waivers as well, 
at least as to certain federal statutory claims. Businesses that want to 
avoid the bundling costs of arbitration, such as the limited right to 
appeal, would prefer to use nonarbitral class waivers. Amex might 
enhance the enforceability of those waivers, and thus to some degree 
increase their use. 
 
